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I. INTRODUCTION
As recently as 1985 a corporation's response to a hostile takeover bid
virtually was unassailable under common law.' Courts largely were unwilling to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A. 1973,
Carleton College; J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota. The author wishes to thank Thomas Shaffer
and Mark Grunewald for their comments on earlier drafts. Financial support of the research for
this Article was provided by the Frances Lewis Law Center at Washington and Lee University.
1. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985)
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disturb management's business judgment that a tender offer was not in the
corporation's (as opposed to the shareholders') best interests. 2 At the same time,
state takeover statutes sought to bolster a target company's common-law position
by erecting various barriers to hostile acquisitions.' Having been dealt a crippling
(upholding discriminatory self-tender). After Unocal, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
acted promptly to prohibit discriminatory self-tender offers. See Amendments to Tender Offer
Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, [1986-87 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016, at 88,186 (Sept. 4, 1986).
2. See, e.g., Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc.,
634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
Application of the business judgment rule to defensive measures has been widely criticized.
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1981) (arguing for management passivity in response
to takeover bids); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 831-48 (1981) (arguing for a structural approach
to the corporation and tender offers that would allow shareholders rather than management to play
the pivotal decision-making role); Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management
in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV. 403, 434-37 (1980) (stating that the use of the business
judgment rule in such situations is inappropriate); Comment, The Misapplication of the Business
Judgment Rule in Contests for Corporate Control, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 980, 1003-10 (1982) (stating
that courts have wrongly relied upon the business judgment rule).
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court modified the business judgment rule and incorporated
the "primary purpose" test, a historically separate doctrinal construct, into the rule. 493 A.2d at
954-56; see Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). Concerned about the inherent
conflict of interest faced by directors in formulating defensive measures, the Delaware Supreme
Court no longer presumes the propriety of such tactics, but requires target directors to prove the
existence of reasonable grounds for believing that a takeover endangers "corporate policy and
effectiveness .. ." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The burden is satisfied by showing "good faith and
reasonable investigation .. " Id. (quoting Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555). Furthermore,
a defensive measure must be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This entails an analysis
by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise." Id.
3. State takeover statutes enacted in the mid-1980s were of several types. First, Maryland
pioneered a "fair price" statute that has been adopted by 13 other states. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS
CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1987); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -
374c (West 1987); FLA. STAT. §§ 607.108-.110 (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to -234
(Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 271A.396-.398 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:132-134 (West Cum. Supp. 1988);
MICH. Conp. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1776-.1784 (West Cum. Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-
1 to -9 (Cum. Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -80 (Michie Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (1985); WASH.
REV. CODE § 23A.08.425 (1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Cum. Supp. 1988).
Second, Ohio originated the "control share acquisition" statute that has been adopted by
14 other states. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-1211 to -1217 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. §§ 607.108-110 (Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
416-171 to -172 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1988); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135-12:140.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IIOE,
§§ 1-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.378-.3793 (1987);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to -98.1 (Michie Supp. 1987); OKIA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (1981
& Cum. Supp. 1987); 1987 Or. Laws ch. 820, §§ 1-13; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to -12 (Cum.
Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1986).
Indiana modified the Ohio statute in a manner that was upheld against constitutional attack
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blow by the Supreme Court in 1982,4 however, those laws were of little con-
sequence. 5
Today, as courts seek to ensure management's compliance with common-
law fiduciary duties, their review of defensive measures is considerably more
in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). All states that have enacted
this type of statute other than Ohio now have adopted Indiana's version. The constitutionality of
Ohio's statute still is unknown because the Supreme Court remanded for further consideration in
light of CTS Corp., a case challenging that statute. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d
135 (6th Cir. 1986), remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
But see Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1032-33 (N.D. Ohio 1988)
(upholding Ohio statute against constitutional attack after finding its differences with Indiana's
statute to be insignificant for constitutional purposes).
Third, Pennsylvania and Maine have adopted statutes giving shareholders the right to receive
the fair value of their shares in cash from a shareholder who acquires 30% or more of the target
company's outstanding stock. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1988); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
Finally, New York enacted a statute that forbade any "business combination" (as defined)
between a target company and a 20% or more shareholder for five years after acquisition of the
20% or more block of stock unless, prior to the acquisition, the target board had approved either
the stock acquisition or the proposed business combination. After five years, such a business
combination requires approval of a disinterested majority of shareholders or payment of a statutorily-
defined fair price. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (Consol. Supp. 1987). Several states have adopted
similar statutes. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201 to -1223 (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-
1-43-1 to -24 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397 (Baldwin 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Cum. Supp. 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.459 (Cum. Supp. 1988);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10A-I (West 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.50 (1987); Wis. STAT. §§
180.725(l)(mm), .725(5)-(6) (1988).
Most notably, on February 2, 1988, Delaware enacted a modified version of the New York
statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988). Delaware's law prohibits any "business combination"
(as defined) between a corporation and a 15% or more shareholder ("interested stockholder") for
three years following the date on which such shareholder became an interested stockholder. The
prohibition does not apply if (i) prior to the date of acquisition by the interested stockholder the
board of directors approved either the proposed business combination or the acquisition of the
stock; or (ii) the interested stockholder's holdings rise in one transaction from less than 15% to
85% (excluding stock of certain insiders and employee stock plans) or more of all outstanding
shares; or (iii) a business combination is approved by the board of directors and by an affirmative
vote of at least 662/3% of the outstanding voting stock not owned by the interested stockholder.
The board of directors may decide to "opt out" of the statute within 90 days of its effective date.
After that, a corporation may opt out of the statute by amending its certificate of incorporation
or bylaws by an affirmative vote of a majority of the shares entitled to vote. The amendment will
not be effective for 12 months, however.
These various kinds of statutes have been described and extensively discussed elsewhere. See,
e.g., Voran & Ponns-Townley, The Changing World of State Takeover Statutes (Part 1), 11 A.L.I.
A.B.A. COURSE MATERIA.s J. 113 (Oct. 1986); Voran & Ponns-Townley, The Changing World of
State Takeover Statutes (Part 2), 11 A.L.I. A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J. 99 (Dec. 1986); Voran
& Ponns-Townley, The Changing World of State Takeover Statutes (Part 3), 11 A.L.I. A.B.A.
COURSE MATERIALS J. 115 (Feb. 1987).
4. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Illinois Business Take-Over Act held
to impose impermissible burden on interstate commerce).
5. After MITE, virtually all challenged takeover statutes were held to be unconstitutional.
See Johnson, Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for New Judicial Analysis
of State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MrrcmHELL L. REv. 183, 191-92 n.29 (1986) (collecting pre-
1986 decisions); see also, Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute unconstitutional), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637
(1987); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding the Ohio Control
Share Acquisition Statute unconstitutional), remanded sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp.,
107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (holding the Hawaii
Control Share Acquisition Statute unconstitutional).
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critical. 6 Moreover, state takeover legislation has been given a substantial boost
by the Supreme Court. 7 Thus, in the period of a few years, both common-law
fiduciary principles and legislative pronouncements on target company conduct
have been revitalized dramatically.
This development especially is intriguing because courts and legislatures
appear to differ on a rather basic point: whose interests should they seek to
protect? Courts, chafing at criticism that they have deferred too long to target
management, are moving to protect shareholder (rather than simply corporate)
interests while, at the same time, expounding an analysis of takeover behavior
that they believe is both conceptually sound and genuinely useful in evaluating
management's actions. The upshot is the discernible emergence of a market-
oriented "auction" model of target company conduct. In essence, courts have
likened target management to "auctioneers" whose chief function is to resolve
takeover contests in a manner yielding the greatest economic return to share-
holders.' In turn, the prospect of stricter judicial review of defensive tactics,
and the desire to avoid the confining role of auctioneer, have motivated man-
agement to preempt takeover attempts. They have done so by significantly
restructuring and leveraging the companies they manage in the hope of appeasing
shareholders with substantial distributions of cash or markedly higher stock
prices. 9 This renewed judicial and managerial attention to investor well-being
has produced two important results. First, target company shareholders are
greatly enriched. 0 Second, management's takeover duty is better aligned with
a basic tenet of orthodox economic and legal theory: corporations invariably
should act to enhance investor welfare."
State takeover statutes do not adhere to such orthodoxy. Quite aside from
the rhetoric employed to defend their enactments, state legislators are not con-
cerned greatly about shareholders, particularly those residing in other states.
They act instead from a legitimate and understandable belief that public cor-
porations having significant connections to their states must serve a broad range
6. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
7. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
9. See generally Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 40-60 (1986) (discussing the empirical evidence supporting this proposition);
A. RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE NEW STANDARD FOR BusnESS PERFORMANCE
10 (1986). See also Sandier, Mania to Buy Back Stock Is Going Too Far, Some Say, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 18, 1987, at 17, col. 1.
10. There is considerable evidence that shareholders of target companies profit from corporate
takeovers. See generally Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
11 J. FIN. EcON. 5 (1983); Jensen, Takeovers: folklore and science, 62 HARV. Bus. REv. 109 (Nov.-
Dec. 1984); Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?,
28 J.L. & EcoN. 151 (1985). While shareholders of target companies experience dramatic wealth
gains from takeovers, it is less clear that shareholders of acquiring corporations also benefit. A
study of 78 mergers and takeovers for the period 1976 through 1981 found that, three years after
consummation, the price of the acquiror's stock was much lower than if it had simply continued
its preacquisition performance. Magenheim & Mueller, On Measuring the Effect of Acquisition on
Acquiring Firm Shareholders 13-26 (Nov. 1985) (unpublished manuscript, available at Journal of
Corporation Law office); see also Weidenbaum & Vogt, Takeovers and Stockholders: Winners and
Losers, 29 CAL. MGMT. REv. 157 (No. 4, 1987) (concluding that, on average, acquiring firm
shareholders often experience wealth loss, or are no better off, as a result of acquisitions).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 15-25.
[Fall
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of noninvestor interests, not simply those of capital providers. 12 In seeking to
accomplish their purposes, while overcoming the Supreme Court's constitutional
objections to their efforts, 3 states, ironically, have turned to their corporate
statutes. States are deploying these statutes, traditionally silent on all corporate
relationships except that of investors and managers, in a novel way-to impede
rather than foster a market-oriented resolution of takeover contests-thereby
aiding local noninvestor interests at the expense of shareholders. In short, just
as the judiciary is relying on unobstructed external capital markets to protect
investor interests, state legislatures are utilizing internal corporate governance
mechanisms to protect noninvestor interests.
These judicial and legislative developments will be described in greater detail
in Parts I and II, respectively, of this Article. In Part III it will be argued that
judicial and legislative notions of corporate purpose and management takeover
conduct are at fundamental odds, and appear to give management conflicting
signals about appropriate takeover behavior. Further, it will be argued that
current takeover statutes-both control share and more potent forms-will suc-
cumb in this clash and fail to accomplish their objectives, and that shareholders
increasingly will enjoy the ascendancy accorded them by economic and legal
orthodoxy. Control share statutes will not fail, however, simply because they
conflict with the new direction of common law. Nor is more potent legislation
doomed merely because it raises troubling constitutional concerns. State takeover
legislation will fail, more importantly, because even though it shrewdly employs
corporate law to meet constitutional objections to its unorthodox noninvestor
protection efforts, it does not genuinely and completely supplant the traditional
focus of that law on the narrow investor-manager relationship, a task that is
much too radical for the present.
II. JUDIciAL ExPREssIONs OF CORPORATE PURPOSE AND MANAGEMENT DUTY
While there is a great deal of commentary on the subject,'4 there are
remarkably few cases that explicitly address the question of what is, or should
be, the proper purpose of corporate activity. There are, however, countless cases
addressing the related issue of management's duty in directing corporate activity.




While formulated in various ways, orthodox economic theory is unequivocal
about what is and, equally important, what ought to be the proper objective
12. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
13. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
14. It would be impossible to cite all of the secondary literature dealing with the issue of
corporate purpose. One selection of such literature appears in the Reporter's Note 6 to The American
Law Institute's PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) (tentatively adopted at the May, 1984 ALI meeting); see also Wedderburn,
The Legal Development of 'Corporate Responsibility: For Whom Will Corporate Managers Be
Trustees?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTOR's LIABarUTEs 3 (K. Hopt & G. Teubner eds.
1985); Axworthy, Corporation Law as if Some People Mattered, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 392 (1986);
Solomon & Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Social Responsibility
Debate, 12 J. CORP. L. 331 (1987).
19881
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of the business firm:" "It is postulated that the business firm-in its typical
form, the corporation-is managed, or at least should be managed, in the sole
interest of the body of shareholders: employed workers and salaried managers
are recruited from markets by the corporation solely to serve as instruments in
achieving this goal."'
6
Several reasons commonly are advanced in support of this objective. First,
both the individual firm's and society's resources will be used most efficiently
if shareholder wealth maximization is pursued. 17 This is simply a corporate
15. Although it is commonly stated that the objective of the business corporation is to
maximize profits for the entity, many economists believe that maximization of shareholder wealth
is a more precise statement of a corporation's objective. This position is reflected in remarks of
Professor Oliver Williamson of Yale University who serves as one of two economic advisors to the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance Project:
Maximization of shareholder gain has a much sharper edge [than maximizing long-
run corporate profit]. Put differently, maximization of long-run corporate profits has
embedded in it more degrees of freedom. I think that the integrity of the enterprise
mode of organization is better protected by adhering to the stockholder gain criterion,
recognizing that such maximization is subject to certain legal, ethical, and social cost
constraints.
My argument here relies on the underlying proposition that the corporation is
preeminently an engine of efficiency. Restriction of the objective of the corporation
to stockholder gain preserves this emphasis .... I think that if you are interested in
an economist's orientation to this subject, that that probably is not uniformly shared
but widely shared.
59 A.L.I. PRoc. 426 (1982) (commenting on proposed § 2.01 of the PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE); see also THE CORPORATE ECONOMY xxii (R. Marris & A. Woods eds. 1971) ("From
a 'classical' viewpoint, 'correct' behavior by managers in general should be aimed at maximizing
at all times the aggregate value of all equity shares .... "). Section 2.01 of the PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Project, entitled The Objective and Conduct of the Business Corporation,
reads in part as follows: "[A] business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain .. " AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01,
comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). By describing the "economic objective" of the corporation
in this dual manner-i.e., entity profit and shareholder gain-the section suggests that corporate
profit and shareholder gain are not always identical. Yet, the section does not attempt to resolve
or even address possible "tensions between corporate profit and shareholder gain," leaving those
to be "dealt with in Part VI [Corporate Control Transactions] and elsewhere." Id.
16. M. AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FrM 3 (1984) (proposing a "co-
operative" game theory of the firm in which employees, and conceivably others, are viewed as
members of the firm along with shareholders).
17. 59 A.L.I. PROC. 426 (1972) ("[T]he corporation is preeminently an engine of efficiency.");
Sprinkel, The Real Issue in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1987, at 18, col. 3 ("In
the process of maximixing the wealth of America's shareholders, we create benefits for the economy
as a whole."); Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance: Two Models of the
Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1983) (describing and contrasting political and economic
models of the corporation). The notion that, over the long run, shareholder and societal well-being
generally coincide is one tenet in what Professor Eisenberg calls the Economic Model of the firm:
"[Mlanaging the corporation in the interest of the shareholders is socially desirable, in that their
interest coincides with the social interest in efficiency." Id. at 5. The belief that maximization of
shareholder wealth also maximizes the collective good has been described by Professor Stone as
resting on "a crude sort of utilitarianism." Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What it Might
Mean, If it Were Really to Matter, 71 IowA L. REV. 557, 570 (1986). Moreover, the economic
model of the corporation does not address the larger question of whether an efficient allocation
of resources is, by some larger measure, always good, just, or desirable. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977).
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application of Adam Smith's belief that man's nature is essentially egoistic and
acquisitive, and that the pursuit of economic utility works, as if by an "invisible
hand," both for his own material advantage and for the common (allocative)
good. 8 Second, wealth maximization is a clear guidepost for management behavior;
to abandon it would leave management with "no criteria to replace the standards
which the economists have painfully developed during the last century or so."' 19
Third, a simple goal makes for easier monitoring and evaluation of management
performance. 20 Fourth, the competence of persons trained as business managers
to pursue goals other than straightforward economic ones is often doubted. 21
Fifth, the claim on corporate resources of nonshareholder groups-such as
employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers-is fixed, and their interests may
conflict with each other. 22 Moreover, such groups can better safeguard their
interests by contract23 or, failing that, can be protected through special legislation. 24
The return to capital providers, however, is residual. Thus they are uniquely
dependent on and entitled to the devoted performance of management. Finally,
Friederich Hayek argued that public intervention into corporate activities-an
evil in his eyes-would surely follow if management were to act for interests
other than those of shareholders.
2
18. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1930).
Interestingly, many who refer to Smith's classic 1776 political economy treatise ignore the fact that,
in 1759, he also wrote a book on moral philosophy in which he depicted man as essentially a
benevolent and altruistic being, not purely an egoist. A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
(1966). A recent attempt to reconcile these seemingly incompatible positions is found in Nieli,
Spheres of Intimacy and The Adam Smith Problem, 47 J. HIST. IDEAS 611 (1986).
19. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 67 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
20. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2, at 679 (1986); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory:
Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 280 (1969).
21. Hetherington, supra note 20, at 279; M. FIREDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 133-34 (1962).
For a quite different view of corporate management's ability to mediate a broad range of interests
in formulating takeover behavior, see Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in America and the
Religious Tradition, in PROCEEDINGS OF m CONFERENCE ON LAW AND THE ORDmING OF OUR LIFE
TOGETHER, ROCKFORD INSTITUTE CENTER FOR RELIGION AND SocIrTY (Apr., 1987) (forthcoming 1988).
Professor Shaffer believes that management has a moral obligation to the entire corporate community
to endure and surmount the ambiguity and indeterminateness that necessarily result when fixed but
impoverished guides to behavior-such as enhancing shareholder well-being-are removed. Id. at
32-37.
22. Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINOS L.J.
1353, 1368 (1979).
23. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme
Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 140 (1986).
24. R. CLARK, supra note 20, §§ 1.4, 16.2.
25.
So long as the management has the one overriding duty of administering the resources
under its control as trustees for the shareholders and for their benefit, its hands are
largely tied; and it will have no arbitrary power to benefit this or that particular
interest. But once the management of a big enterprise is regarded as not only entitled
to but even obliged to consider in its decision whatever is regarded as the public or
social interest, or to support good causes and generally to act for the public benefit,
it gains indeed an uncontrollable power-a power which could not long be left in the
hands of private managers but would inevitably be made the subject of increasing
public control.
3 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 82 (1982);
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The Journal of Corporation Law
2. The Berle and Dodd Exchange
Neither orthodoxy's economic postulate itself nor its underlying rationale
might have been of much interest to corporate law were it not for Berle and
Means' unsettling assertion that the diffusion of share ownership in public
corporations freed corporate managers of any need to pursue rigorously shareholder
welfare, and thus threatened the continuing validity of the postulate. 26 This
observation evoked two quite different responses. One response, by Professor
Berle himself, was to draw on the law of trusts as a means of reuniting the
capital-providing and capital-managing functions that the large corporation had,
of necessity, sundered. 27 Berle argued that: "[A]II powers granted to a corporation
or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation,
whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest
appears. ' 2 Berle hoped that judicial adherence to such a trust conception of
the corporation would circumscribe management discretion and ensure that-
consistent with economic theory-shareholder-owners remained the chief beneficiary
of corporate activities.
Professor Merrick Dodd provided an altogether different response to the
problem identified by Berle and Means. 29 He fully sympathized with Berle's
efforts to strengthen the position of shareholders vis-a-vis management, but
believed it undesirable "to give increased emphasis at the present time to the
view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making pofits for
their stockholders.' '30 Dodd essentially rejected the position of economic orthodoxy
as unsuitably narrow for an institution having the economic and social influence
of the modern public corporation. He advocated instead that businesses should
serve consciously the interests of employees, consumers, and the general public,
as well as those of shareholders. 3
3. Decisional Law
In 1954 Berle stated that his exchange with Dodd had "been settled (at
least for the time being) in favor of Professor Dodd's contention. 3 2 The apparent
reason for Berle's concession was the decision in A.P. Smith Manufacturing
Co. v. Barlow,3  which upheld a $1500 corporate contribution to Princeton
University. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the gift on three grounds.
see also Rostow, supra note 19, at 67, 71 (discussing the relationship of management to shareholders);
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 133-34 (stating that for corporate managment to do other than
maximize profit for shareholders is a "fundamentally subversive doctrine").
26. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 352-57 (1932).
27. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
28. Id. at 1049 (emphasis added).
29. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
30. Id. at 1148.
31. Id. at 1161-62.
32. A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). That is not to say,
however, that Professor Berle considered Dodd's stance to be the proper one, only that that position
is "how social fact and judicial decisions turned out." Berle, Foreword to E. MASON, THE COR-
PORATION IN MODERN SocIETY at xii (1959).
33. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
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First, because the gift ostensibly advanced corporate objectives, and thus
"benefited" the corporation, it complied with common-law principles.34 Second,
statutory authorization to make corporate contributions was held to apply to
corporations chartered prior to passage of the authorizing legislation.35 Third,
quite apart from corporate benefit or statutory grant, the court sounded much
like Professor Dodd in asserting that "modern conditions require that corporations
acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members
of the communities within which they operate." 3 6
While the A.P. Smith case is regarded widely as a landmark decision, it
is important to keep it in perspective. First, except in the very limited areas of
charitable contributions and employee benefits,3 7 and quite apart from a good
deal of extra-judicial rhetoric on the subject, there is virtually no judicial
acknowledgment that corporations exist for any purpose other than what economic
orthodoxy and Professor Berle had initially asserted: the well-being of shareholders.
Thus, neither the A.P. Smith decision itself nor any judicial holding since then
provides a sound basis for conceding that courts have adopted Professor Dodd's
conception of corporate purpose. Second, even with respect to the charitable
contribution and employee benefit cases many, perhaps all, of them might be
rationalized on the ground that such corporate solicitude is in fact profit-
maximizing, and thus, beneficial to investors, over the conveniently vague and
elusive "long-run." ' 3 In this way, the stated objective of the firm remains a
purely economic one, the well-being of shareholders, and the only issues are
the relevant time horizon and the range of activities that may be engaged in
for its attainment.
Where, however, the clash between the profit purpose and other objectives
is too glaring, or there simply is no long-run because a company is in or near
liquidation, such rationalization is unavailable. Here courts are clear that
shareholder interests are paramount, and Berle's concession to Dodd is seen to
be in error or, at best, premature. Two older cases in particular make this
point, a point that is central (if implicit) to later judicial prescriptions of proper
takeover behavior.
In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. ,39 a group of shareholders brought an action
to compel the payment of dividends. In previous years the company had paid
both regular dividends and very large special dividends. Henry Ford, however,
announced that henceforth such special dividends would no longer be paid.
Instead, the corporation would use such funds to expand and provide more jobs
and to reduce prices to consumers. The Michigan Supreme Court compelled the
payment of a $19,000,000 dividend and, without recitation of authority for its
position, chided Mr. Ford for his misguided solicitude:
34. Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
35. Id. at 160, 98 A.2d at 589.
36. Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
37. See generally P. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 1-52
(1972) (discussing the legal basis for corporate involvement in charitable community affairs).
38. Professors Solomon and Collins recently have termed this conception of corporate activity
the "moderate market model" to contrast it with the "pure market model" which permits no
activity not singularly motivated by the pursuit of profits. Solomon & Collins, supra note 14, at
332-36.
39. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the shareholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to obtain that end, and does not extend to
a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them
to other purposes. . . . [Ilt is not within the lawful powers of a board
of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for
the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary
purpose of benefiting others . . .40
Similarly, in Parke v. Daily News, Ltd. ,41 the board of directors of a
corporation selling two newspaper operations that generated the vast majority
of its revenue sought to use the entire net sales proceeds to provide employees
with severance pay and pension benefits as well as compensation in the amount
of one week's pay for each year of service. The court held the payments to be
ultra vires and not to have been shown to benefit the company-i.e., shareholders-
because it would operate on a substantially reduced basis after the sale. The
court acknowledged that the "view that directors, in having regard to the question
what is in the best interests of their company, are entitled to take into account
the interests of the employees, irrespective of any consequential benefit to the
company, is one which may be widely held."
' 42 Nonetheless, it went on to
conclude that there simply was no judicial precedent for that position, and that
"such is not the law."' 43 In short, while the court essentially conceded that
Professor Dodd had espoused a theory having many sympathizers and even
considerable appeal as a matter of enlightened industrial relations, when the
issue of corporate purpose is presented in a manner that cannot be resolved by
reference to the long-run the law is unmistakeable: corporate activity must benefit
the shareholders.
Thus, in the few instances where the issue of corporate purpose has been
put squarely, the rhetoric of decisional law comports with economic orthodoxy
in regarding shareholders as the chief beneficiary of corporate endeavor. Whether
courts effectively have ensured that management actually pursue and achieve




a. Fiduciary Duties to a Corporation and its Shareholders
Although the purpose of corporate activity may be profit maximization and
shareholder well-being, courts do not formulate the fiduciary duty of corporate
40. Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
41. [19621 1 Ch. 929 (Del. Ch.).
42. Id. at 962-63.
43. Id. at 963; see also Hutton v. West Cork Ry. Co., 23 Ch. D. 654, 677 (C.A. 1883)
(ultra vires for liquidating corporation to compensate directors for past services); Teck Corp. v.
Millar, 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, 314 (B.C.S.C. 1972) (citing Parke for the proposition that, while directors
may consider the interests of employees and the community when formulating corporate policy, it
is a breach of duty for directors to disregard entirely shareholder welfare to benefit those interests).
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management in those terms. That is, management's legal duty is not described
in terms of its compliance with the tenets of economic orthodoxy. The sheer
impossibility of defining precise standards for measuring performance would
make such an outcome-oriented conception of duty judicially unenforceable. 44
Instead, management simply is exhorted to act in the "best interests" of the
"corporation, 45  and is admonished that in doing so it owes both a duty of
"care" 46 and a duty of "loyalty. '47 Even this expression is somewhat misleading,
however, because neither duty actually requires attainment of the best outcome,
only that particular business decisions be informed4 8 rational, 49 and free of
fraud, conflict of interest, or illegality.5 0 Moreover, the business judgment rule
creates a presumption that, absent fraud, conflict of interest, or illegality,
management's actions are in fact fully informed and in the best interests of the
company, 5 1 thereby making it extremely difficult to prove that management, far
from failing to maximize profits or shareholder well-being generally, even was
remiss on a specific transaction. As a result, even though courts may be quite
sensible in firmly resisting any attempt to involve them in the regulation or
oversight of normal business activities, the manner in which they express
management's duty does create a potential schism between stated corporate
purpose and actual corporate performance, a schism that long has plagued
corporate governance.
Even where shareholders allege a conflict of interest-i.e., duty of loyalty
cases-management's performance still is not reviewed wholesale, but only as
to a specified matter. More importantly, while judicial review of management
behavior is said to be much stricter in loyalty cases than in duty of care cases ,52
the traditional mode of analysis in loyalty decisions obscures the nature of
management duty in such a way that they are of no greater utility in assessing
the propriety or efficacy of management's takeover behavior than those applying
the business judgment rule. The reason for this is very simple. In classic duty
44. Hetherington, supra note 20, at 258, 274. The difficulties in trying to achieve effective
management of corporations by various "legal rules" have led some to conclude that that objective
is attained best through the workings of various markets-e.g., markets for capital, products,
management services, and the market for corporate control. R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 300-13;
Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 388 (1977); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965).
45. See, e.g., MODEL BUSnESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984).
46. Id. See generally R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 3.4 (discussing the case law development
of the duty of care).
47. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (1938), aff'd, 23 Del. Ch.
255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939). See generally Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35
(1966) (detailing directors' duties in a conflict of interest situation).
48. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985); see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCnPIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMNENDATIONS § 4.01(c)(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 4, Apr. 12, 1985).
49. Id. § 4.01(c)(3).
50. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 I11. App. 2d 173, 183, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1968).
51. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The Delaware Supreme Court modified
the Aronson formulation of the business judgment rule for target director hostile takeover behavior
in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
52. See generally R. CLARK, supra note 20, at ch. 5 (discussing self dealing by corporate
management).
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of loyalty cases-such as those involving self-dealing by management-the interests
of the corporate entity and the body of shareholders are identical. If managers
unfairly favor themselves in such transactions, they damage the corporate entity
by lowering net profits or asset value. They also damage the shareholders, both
by reducing the amount of funds available for distribution and, by lowering
entity profitability or asset value, potentially reducing the market price of the
stock. This identity of interests accounts for a phrase that surfaced early in
corporate law53 and that recurs throughout decisions evaluating management's
compliance with its fiduciary duties-corporate management is said to owe
fiduciary duties to the "corporation and its shareholders.
54
However accurate and useful that expression of dual duty may be in common-
place loyalty decisions, it has proven to be a real menace when uncritically
recited in cases challenging management's takeover behavior. In a takeover, the
interests of the corporation, either as an ongoing commercial entity or as a
codeword for its various constituent interests, may be quite different from those
of capital providers. While most investors surely savor the option of tendering
their stock at substantial premiums to hostile bidders, such premiums are often
possible only because a bidder intends to drastically alter, perhaps even liquidate,
the entity's affairs and its extensive cluster of noninvestor relationships. If, as
was discussed in section A of this Part, the principal purpose of corporate
activity is truly investor well-being, the entity simply being a vehicle to that
end, then the opportunity to sell stock at a generous premium is yet another
more immediate way in which shareholders can extract value from the business,
and their interests always should trump those of noninvestors or the entity itself.
Expressed in terms of legal duty then, management's general duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation, in a takeover, may be required to yield to a
higher, more precise duty running exclusively to shareholders.
Prior to Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.," courts
generally did not formulate management's takeover obligations in this manner.
When reviewing defensive measures, courts not only failed to differentiate between
the corporate entity and the body of shareholders as the exact beneficiary of
management's takeover duties, they often applied the business judgment rule
without even acknowledging that, initially at least, an investor rather than a
purely corporate matter was involved.5 6 Courts apparently did not appreciate
that takeover contests presented shareholders with a uniquely direct avenue for
action-deciding either to hold or tender their stock-without having to rely on
53. This identity of interests was described in an early corporate law treatise:
The rule is thoroughly embedded in the general jurisprudence of both America and
England that the status of directors is such that they occupy a fiduciary relation toward
the corporation and its stockholders .... [Tihey are regarded as agents entrusted with
the management of the corporation, for the benefit of the stockholders collectively
2 S. THompSON, CORPORATIONS § 1320, at 778 (3d ed. 1927).
54. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (1938), aff'd, 23
Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. Super. Ct.
1984).
55. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
56. See cases cited supra note 2.
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management's business expertise to augment their wealth. If some courts did
recognize the novel role of takeovers in providing shareholder choice, having
completely detached their traditional formulation of management's duty-i.e.,
to act in the best interests of the corporation-from the underlying corporate
purpose-i.e., investor wealth maximization-they were ill-equipped to articulate
any basis for judicial intervention.
Once a hostile offer is made, the target company management is placed in
a real bind. As fiduciaries, managers must restrain their own urges and act for
the good of others. Yet, psychologically, the overture is a personal affront,
bringing to the surface a deep need to preserve the life they have by making
a scene or putting on a show-indulging in the histronic to renew their sense
of self, purpose, and value. Thus, it is understandable that management will
resist unwanted advances because, in essence, its past performance is being
criticized as deficient and its future tenure is placed in jeopardy. Almost certainly
it will respond in a manner that involves the corporate entity-perhaps by finding
a friendly merger candidate, or by altering its asset composition or its capital
structure in some way designed to defeat the tender offer directed at shareholders.
Because management has taken the initiative and acted through the corporation,
though not necessarily for the benefit of shareholders, when reviewing defensive
measures judges are asked only to evaluate the propriety of such corporate
action, and they have done so by a simplistic reliance on well-settled precedent
that courts will not disturb management's business judgment.5 7 The result was
predictable: the challenged conduct was upheld, even where demonstrably adverse
to shareholders, because a priori courts beiieved themselves to be incapable of
evaluating the outcome of any corporate action initiated by management. Thus,
newly-presented with the possibility that hostile takeovers might serve to ensure
that corporate performance is linked to and fulfills the corporate purpose of
shareholder well-being, investors simply were lost in the analysis, having fallen
victim to principles of judicial review that were developed in wholly-dissimilar
settings.
Even judges who believe that target management behavior raises an issue
of loyalty as well as care, and thus, are inclined to review management conduct
much more strictly, fail to address the underlying issue of whether management
has an affirmative and overriding duty to shareholders (not simply to the
corporation) to procure a premium for their stock-i.e., to use the economist's
phrase, a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. 8 Instead, these courts, as in
57. Id.
58. In Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984), target management
issued sufficient common and preferred stock to its wholly-owned Panamanian subsidiary and to
a newly created Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) to enable management to retain voting
control of the corporation. In a decision reviewing the grant of a preliminary injunction against
the voting of the newly-issued shares, the Second Circuit found that the circumstances of the defensive
measures raised a "strong inference" that the purpose of the transactions was "not to benefit the
employees [as claimed by management] but rather to solidify management's control of the company."
Id. at 265. The court resolved the propriety of issuing stock to a wholly-owned subsidiary by
looking to applicable statutory law, but turned to common-law fiduciary principles to decide the
legality of issuing stock to the ESOP. Id. at 264-66. Because the board's action appeared to be
motivated largely by self-interest rather than by other "corporate" purposes, the court declined to
apply the business judgment rule and stated that "the duty of loyalty requires the board to demonstrate
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the traditional duty of loyalty cases from which they mistakenly seek guidance,
have sought only to ascertain whether defensive actions unduly were tainted by
management self interest. When management can plausibly advance some corporate
rather than selfish purpose for its behavior, courts will uphold the measures.
5 9
Yet, if investor interests truly are paramount and their well-being the proper
end of corporate endeavor, justifying defensive measures as free of management
self-interest and as being in the best interest of the corporation simply is irrelevant.
Serious devotion to investor welfare requires that management's takeover conduct
be evaluated exclusively in terms of its responsiveness to shareholder preferences,
and its efficacy in maximizing investor opportunities to obtain the immediate
economic benefits of takeover contests. Thus, economic orthodoxy demands, at
a minimum, that management not impede investor choice
6° and, better, that it
affirmatively attempt to obtain the greatest reasonably expected benefits of a
tender offer or competing offer-that is, engage in resistance behavior which
maximizes shareholder value6 -while not altogether defeating the opportunity
to sell. 62
that any actions it does take are fair and reasonable." Id. at 266. The board having failed in that
showing, the court upheld the granting of an injunction. Id. at 269.
Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), involved the
validity, under New Jersey law, of various "scorched earth" tactics and a "poison pill" stock rights
plan that were implemented immediately before a hostile tender offer. Id. at 1253-54. The court
initially questioned whether the business judgment rule should be applied in reviewing target man-
agement's takeover behavior. Id. at 1259. The court expressed the view that the decision to sell
stock is a "private transaction" and an "independent right of alienation" in which the board's
effort to act as a "surrogate" for the shareholders was "troublesome." Id. at 1260 n.6. The Minstar
court's holding did not require it to confront squarely the issue of judicial deference to management
action having such significant governance overtones. Nonetheless, its concern about delineating the
respective provinces of shareholders and directors clearly underlay the court's decision to strike
down the "poison pill" rights plan under state law because, in several ways, the plan improperly
infringed on stockholder rights. Id. at 1258-59. Furthermore, relying on Norlin as authority for
requiring the target board to prove the fairness of defensive measures motivated by management
self-interest, rather than by other "corporate" purposes, the Minstar court also held that management
had failed to meet that burden with respect to the "scorched earth" tactics. Id. at 1260.
While both the Norlin and Minstar decisions show a fairly critical judicial attitude toward
defensive measures, they focus only on management's subjective motivation in implementing defensive
measures. The more relevant issue is not why they acted as they did, but whether what they did
was in the best interests of shareholders and who ought to decide these matters.
59. See, e.g., Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 633 F. Supp. 1066, 1070-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (management met the burden of proving that establishment and funding of ESOP
was not motivated by its desire to maintain control).
60. In 1982 Professors Easterbrook and Fischel argued that management of a target company
should remain passive toward and take no action to resist a takeover attempt. Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 2, at 1194.
61. Many commentators argue that target company management should not remain passive
but should be allowed to resist a takeover for the purpose of eliciting competing bids and, in effect,
"auctioning" the corporation on behalf of the shareholders at the highest price. See, e.g., Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51
(1982); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Bebchuk,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 23
(1982); Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers:
A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985). Nothwithstanding such commentary,
pre-Revlon courts allowed target management to select entity survival and protection of existing
corporate policy as its focus rather than immediate shareholder gain.
62. See Jarrell, supra note 10, at 151 (empirical study that target management resistance to
an unwanted takeover attempt produces greater returns to shareholders than passivity provided the
defensive measures are not so potent that they ultimately defeat the bid).
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This critique of decisional law is not intended as an argument in support
of, or in opposition to, the position that shareholder interests and preferences
should be determinative for a target company's takeover behavior. Nor is it
meant to resolve whether corporate management should be made to heed more
closely, or instead be freed to disregard, the sometimes fickle sentiments of the
financial markets about its business strategies.63 The aim simply is to argue that
when reviewing management's takeover conduct courts have evaded resolution
of these central issues. While it is widely accepted that the chief goal of corporate
activity is to maximize shareholder gain, courts also appreciate that in most
instances they cannot possibly ascertain whether management's operating policies
have fulfilled that objective. Consequently, unless shareholders have effective
devices for disciplining management for deficient performance, management may
operate the corporation in a manner that does not serve investor interests as
faithfully as orthodox theory assumes. Tender offers are one such mechanism
for disciplining management. Management responses to hostile takeover bids,
however, are not like mundane operating decisions, and, hence, judicial deference
is unwarranted and unnecessary. In fact, by presenting a potentially striking
clash between investor and other interests, takeover contests raise the same issue
dealt with in the Dodge6 and Parke65 cases, the bedrock issue of corporate
purpose. Pre-Revlon courts, however, were unwilling to acknowledge that eventually
they must speak, as did those two older decisions, to this question of corporate
objective, the most elemental, stubborn issue raised by the takeover phenomenon.
If we take seriously the fundamental postulate of economic and legal
orthodoxy, then it is hard to deny that shareholders have been mistreated badly,
both by management efforts to thwart takeover attempts and by courts upholding
such actions. Nonetheless, given the mounting concern over the effects of
widespread takeover activity on our corporate system,66 many have balked at
extending the fundamental postulate that far. This uneasiness is especially
understandable given that the tenets of economic orthodoxy were conceived long
before the appearance of corporate takeovers. Moreover, a desire for conceptual
purity may cause some to lose sight of the fact that the pursuit of shareholder
well-being is, under orthodoxy, presumed to be congruent with the larger public
good. But where that congruence is claimed to be absent, as many have asserted
63. Professor Margotta has argued that while the threat of a hostile takeover increases
competitiveness in financial markets, it also clearly reduces competition in real product markets and
requires corporate management to pursue operating strategies that appeal to participants in the
financial markets. Margotta, Distorting Corporate Investment, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1987, at 3B,
col. 3. The recent unprecedented collapse of stock prices strengthens the argument of those who
argue that management should not be held captive by often erratic, occasionally volatile capital
markets. Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
64. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Drucker, Corporate takeovers-what is to be done? 82 PuB. INT. 3, 3 (1986);
Drucker, A Crisis of Capitalism, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1986, at 32, col 3; Fogg, Takeovers: last
chance for self-restraint, 63 HARv. Bus. Rv. 30 (Nov.-Dec. 1985); Hayes & Abernathy, Managing
our way to economic decline, 58 HARv. Bus. REv. 67 (July-Aug. 1980); R. REICH, THE NEXT
AMERicAN FRONTIER 140-72 (1983); see also The End of Corporate Loyalty? Bus WK., Aug. 4,
1986, at 42. But see Jarrell & Lehn, Takeover Threats Don't Crimp Long-Term Planning, Wall
St. J., May 1, 1985, at 32, col. 3; Pound, Lehn, & Jarrell, Are Takeovers Hostile to Economic
Performance?, REG., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 25.
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with respect to takeovers, the monistic pursuit of investor welfare loses its
moorings in the larger society. As a result, while many will concede that
shareholder interests are indeed markedly different from other corporate interests
in takeovers, they also contend that investor interests are not preeminent.
6 7
Instead, shareholders are viewed as just one faction in the corporate family, a
faction whose interests are in fact subordinate to (or at best, perhaps, subsumed
under) more collaborative corporate interests. As such, it might be argued that
the prescriptions of orthodoxy must yield, and that management's usual alliance
with capital providers should and does break-down in a takeover, shifting, oddly,
toward those very constituencies it generally opposes on behalf of investors-
employees, creditors, suppliers, and the community at large.
Quite aside from the merits or appeal of this position, it must be appreciated
that it usurps a valuable and heretofore unquestioned attribute of stock ownership-
the ability of shareholders in public corporations to receive, entertain, and act
decisively on attractive bids to purchase their stock without interference by
corporate management. Not only does this directly impinge on shareholder wealth,
it dampens a potent market mechanism for monitoring management behavior
that legal rules and judicial review cannot readily provide. The result of this
interference with the market is a further erosion of shareholder influence over
corporate affairs. More importantly, it substantially modifies the fundamental
postulate of orthodoxy so that shareholder wealth maximization is not to be
sought in the full range of benefits brought by highly developed capital markets
bearing stock premiums, but only over the long-run, or at least over that period
of time and in that manner chosen by incumbent management. Proponents of
this position ideally might seek to preserve the illusion of shareholder primacy
in the same way that the corporate charitable contribution cases were woven
into economic orthodoxy-by reference to the all-encompassing but vague long-
run. With takeovers, however, such a resolution strains theory too severely, and
in the end investor desires to obtain immediate stock premiums are forced to
give way to what adherents to this position believe are more important
considerations.
b. Consideration of Noninvestor Interests
Numerous cases might be pointed to as apparently supporting the proposition
that courts have not evaded, as argued above, their responsibility to either adhere
to or candidly reject the fundamental postulate of investor primacy, but instead
have held explicitly that management's takeover duties are not confined to
shareholder well-being and, shades of Dodd, 68 extend to the enterprise itself and
even to certain noninvestor interests. For example, certain Delaware decisions
make it clear that corporate share repurchases undertaken to prevent takeovers
that threaten the corporate entity or its business policy are proper, while those
motivated by a desire to preserve control in management are improper. 69 Thus,
in Kors v. Carey,70 the corporate interest to be protected was the preservation
67. See Shaffer, supra note 21, at 36; M. AOKI, supra note 16, at 3.
68. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
69. Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 20-21, 187 A.2d 405, 408-09 (1962); Yasik v. Wachtel,
25 Del. Ch. 247, 256-57, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (1941).
70. 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960).
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of established relationships with customers that the directors believed would be
damaged, to the detriment of the enterprise, if the insurgent gained control. In
Cheff v. Mathes,7' a dissident shareholder's likely change in sales policies and
the resulting employee unrest constituted sufficient threat to the corporate interest
to meet the directors' burden of proving that the share repurchase was in the
corporate interest. More recently, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,72
the Delaware Supreme Court refrained from equating corporate and shareholder
interests when it asserted that the board had a "fundamental duty and obligation
to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders . . .-71 The
court further stated that in analyzing the effect of a takeover bid on the corporate
enterprise directors may consider, among other matters, the impact on "creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally . .. .14
Other decisions have cited possible harm to various noninvestor interests in
either providing injunctive relief from takeover attempts or upholding defensive
measures. Among such interests were employee morale 7 and even the public
interest.76 One of the most direct statements on the place of noninvestors in
corporate decision-making was made by the Tenth Circuit in holding that the
directors of the corporation owning the Denver Post had acted properly in
taking certain challenged actions:
We are fully cognizant of the well established corporate rule of law
which places corporate officers and directors in the position of fiduciaries
for the stockholders. Basic in that rule of law is the profit motive
of the corporate entity. In this case we have a corporation engaged
chiefly in the publication of a large metropolitan newspaper, whose
obligation and duty is something more than the making of corporate
profits. Its obligation is threefold: to the stockholders, to the employees,
and to the public. 77
More recently, a federal district court made much the same kind of statement
in an almost classic expression of Dodd's view that directors are equipped to,
and should, mediate the interests of various constituencies:
The exercise of independent, honest business judgment of an enlightened
and disinterested Board is the traditional and appropriate way to deal
fairly and even-handedly with both the protection of investors, on
the one hand, and the legitimate concerns and interests of employees
and management of a corporation who service the interests of investors,
on the other.
78
71. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
72. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
73. Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 955.
75. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979); Boyes
Form Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Abramson v. Nytronics,
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 689
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (refusal to enjoin standstill agreement because of stability it provided to corporation
in its relations with employees and other noninvestors).
76. Grummon Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981).
77. Harold Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972).
78. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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However apparently clear the language in these opinions, there is a danger
of making too much of these decisions as authority for the proposition that
management properly may consider noninvestor corporate interests in takeovers,
just as there is a danger of reading the charitable contribution and employee
benefit cases as altering the basic purpose of corporate activity.
79 Most statements
about noninvestor interests are dicta and unnecessary for resolving the issues
presented. Furthermore, given the posture of the cases, it is not at all clear
that shareholders actually were deprived of an opportunity to accept an outstanding
tender offer or that they otherwise were damaged. Moreover, the statements
were made less to highlight the affirmative claim of various noninvestors on
the corporation than to emphasize the variety of factors that management, in
its wide discretion, may consider in formulating takeover responses.
Thus, at one level these decisions might be viewed as simply respecting
management's judgment that the takeover attempt should be resisted because it
was not in the long run interests of shareholders. As such, management's
purported concern for corporate policy and various noninvestor interests are but
intermediate concerns, important only for their contribution to the eventual
welfare of shareholders. 80 Yet, by implicitly seeking to reconcile interests in this
manner, the courts fail to state precisely why shareholders should not be entitled
to elect an immediate stock premium for themselves over longer-run profit for
the entity, or why management should not be unfailingly allegiant to investor
desires. Nor do these decisions deal with takeovers as perhaps the only effective
means for investors to express profound displeasure with management's long-
term operating decisions, and as possibly the only opportunity for investors to
displace management against its will. Instead, while these decisions might with
some effort be wedged into the orthodox view that corporations are to be
operated for the ultimate good of shareholders, the time frame for realizing
economic returns from corporate activity is not decided by shareholders exercising
the customary right to alienate their stock, but once again, as with other
"corporate" decisions, is determined by management's business judgment. One
striking result of these decisions is the preservation of management prerogative
rather than any particular protection of either investor or noninvestor interests.
Another result, typical of most pre-Revlon takeover decisions, is that investor
claims on corporate activities substantially were weakened, to the point that
shareholder well-being is less clearly the corporation's chief purpose. Eventually
this potential warping of conventional economic and legal ideology required
attention.
2. Revlon and Other Recent Decisions
In Revlon the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that it was addressing
for the first time the "extent to which a corporation may consider the impact
79. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
80. The court in Union Carbide stated that the Union Carbide board's duty was "solely to
the welfare of Carbide's investors and to deal with the interests of Carbide's employees and
management fairly, in furtherance of those interests of investors." 624 F. Supp. at 1019. This
statement seems to imply that the interests of management and employees are significant only in
that they further investor interests.
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of a takeover threat on constituencies other than shareholders."'" While complex,
the essential facts are as follows: MacAndrews and Forbes (M and F) made an
offer to purchase Revlon that the Revlon board rejected. The board then adopted
a "poison pill" rights plan somewhat similar to that upheld in Moran v.
Household International, Inc. 2 M and F then offered $47.50 per share for all
of Revlon's shares, subject to procuring financing and redemption of the rights.
Revlon responded with an offer to exchange notes and preferred stock for 26%
of its outstanding stock. The notes contained covenants limiting the amount of
additional debt that could be incurred by the company, thereby making M and
F's proposed financing plan more difficult.
M and F responded to the exchange offer by initially reducing its offer to
$42 per share, but then increasing it, first to $50 and then to $53, conditioned
again on redemption of the rights. The Revlon board, however, entered a
leveraged buy-out agreement with Forstmann, Little & Co. and certain members
of management for $56 per share. M and F responded by raising its bid to
$56.25 and announced that it would engage in "fractional bidding" to defeat
any other offer for Revlon. Forstmann then offered $57.25 for Revlon, conditioned
on obtaining a lock-up option on two substantial divisions of Revlon, a no-
shop provision, and a $25 million "break-up" fee. In addition, Forstmann agreed
to support the market value of the notes that Revlon had issued in its exchange
offer and which had declined in value. Acting in part out of a concern for the
noteholders-or perhaps from their threat of litigation over the decline in value
of the notes-the Revlon board accepted this offer.
M and F then raised its offer to $58 and sued to enjoin the lock-up option
and break-up fee. The Delaware Chancery Court issued an injunction and the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. The Delaware Supreme Court began its
analysis by stating that the business judgment rule protects those decisions by
directors as are in the best interests of the "company." s3 The court also recited
the common, but fuzzy, notion that directors owe fiduciary duties to the
"corporation and its shareholders.' ' 4 The court then stated that the initial
implementation of the rights plan was lawful because it served corporate interests
and, because the plan "spurred the bidding to new heights," it was in the best
interests of shareholders as well.85 Although the court did not explain the corporate
interest in the plan, apparently it believed that corporate and shareholder well-
being coincided on this issue.
Only as the court addressed the lock-up option did it recognize the need
to clarify and distinguish management's duty to shareholders from its duty to
the corporation. In doing so, the court spoke of a "change" in duty so that
obtaining the maximum price for shareholders should have been the directors'
sole concern once a sale of the company became inevitable. 6 As such, solicitude
for noninvestor interests or for preserving the corporate enterprise was,
notwithstanding Unocal's dictum on the propriety of such considerations, no
81. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986).
82. 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).
83. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
84. Id. at 179.
85. Id. at 181.
86. Id. at 182.
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longer appropriate.17 The remainder of the opinion went on to discuss Revlon's
defensive measures exclusively in terms of how they affected investor welfare,
concluding that the lock-up option was invalid because it ended the auction of
the company to the detriment of shareholders.8
The important question is whether the idea of a "change" in directors'
duties will be confined to the Revlon facts, or whether the decision marks the
beginning of an effort to elucidate director takeover duties more generally.
Notwithstanding the Delaware Supreme Court's recent attempt to reign in the
full implications of its Revlon decision, s9 there are several reasons for believing
87. Id.
88. Id. at 184-85.
89. In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), the Delaware
Supreme Court, in upholding Newmont's defensive actions against T. Boone Pickens (acting through
Ivanhoe), had occasion to address the reach of the Revlon duty to auction. In the Newmont case,
Newmont's investment bankers determined that Ivanhoe's initial proposal of $95 per share was
inadequate. Ivanhoe, which owned 9.95% of Newmont's stock, then made an offer for 42% of
Newmont's stock at $95 per share. Ivanhoe's purchase of more than 9.9% of Newmont stock
triggered a clause in a 1983 standstill agreement between Gold Field, a 26% shareholder in Newmont,
and Newmont that freed Gold Field from the standstill agreement. Newmont, concerned about
threats from both Ivanhoe and Gold Field, declared a $33 per share dividend in return for Gold
Field agreeing to amend the standstill agreement to provide, among other things, that its duration
extend to 1997. Gold Field then used the dividend to purchase enough Newmont stock in a "street
sweep" to give it a formidable 49.7% of Newmont's outstanding stock. Newmont's defensive plan
was upheld under Unocal's modified business judgment rule, id. at 1345, perhaps not unexpectedly
given Pickens' reputation for seeking greenmail and causing corporate break-ups (a reputation that
also damaged him in Unocal) and, significantly, given the two-tier nature of the bid.
The court also, however, had to contend with Revlon. The court distinguished Revlon by
saying, first, that in the case before it no sale of the target was inevitable because Newmont in
fact was not for sale and, second, no bidding contest had developed. Id. As to the absence of a
bidding contest, had Newmont not revived the lapsed standstill agreement Gold Field might have
acted to protect its position against the threat of Ivanhoe, possibly bidding for Newmont itself (as
its investment advisor suggested), or selling to a third party who might then compete with Ivanhoe.
The court did not fully address the possibility. More importantly, the Newmont court did not
satisfactorily settle the question of why directors have no general duty to maximize value to
shareholders once a bid has been initiated. Instead, the court observed that the defense insured the
"continued interest of the public shareholders in the independent control and prosperity of Newmont."
Id. Is that the only interest of shareholders in a takeover contest? To say that the court simply
ducked the wealth and governance implications of its decision for shareholders is to put it mildly.
While the Newmont decision may mean that directors are not in every instance required to
"auction" a target company, the apparent relief is only temporary, and the fundamental issue raised
in that and other similar cases will and must be revisited. Indeed, recent 1988 decisions reveal that
courts clearly test defensive measures against the Revlon auction concept of director duty. In Black
and Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988), the court issued
a preliminary injunction against a proposed defensive recapitalization because the court believed
that the bidder was likely to prevail on its claim that the plan, designed to ensure management
control of the target, was a "sale" triggering the Revlon duty to obtain the best price for stockholders.
Id. at 779-80. In CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y 1988), the
court refused to enjoin a "poison pill" rights plan because the target directors had deployed the
plan to solicit competing bids and additional, more advantageous bids from the first offeror. The
court stated that the plan enabled the directors to fulfill their Revlon duty because it provided
them with a "shield to fend off coercive offers and with a gavel to run an auction." Id. at 439.
In another opinion, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld a target board's refusal to redeem
"poison pill" rights during a tender offer contest because the plan enabled the board to seek a
higher competing bid at a time when market price exceeded the bid price. Tate & Lyle PLC and
RP Acquisition Corp. v. Stanley Continental, Inc., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
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that by finally differentiating shareholder and corporate interests Revlon signifies
a major shift in judicial review of takeover conduct, and that defensive measures
of all kinds and at all stages of a takeover will be scrutinized more closely to
determine their specific impact on shareholders.
First, the precise nature of management's duty to shareholders in a takeover
needs clarification beyond the traditionally vague command to act in the best
interests of the "corporation and its shareholders." This requires an evaluation
of the shareholders' claim on the corporation, assessing the significance of their
status as capital providers in relation to other important demands on corporate
activity, both before and during a takeover bid. Courts must decide whether
shareholders are entitled to more from management than devotion to long-term
profit maximization for the entity, and resolve whether (and explain why) investors
deserve opportunities for stock premiums as well. In candidly confronting this
issue, which has long lingered just beneath the surface of their opinions, courts
must consider not only the wealth effects of takeovers, but also their value as
a very potent-perhaps overly potent-mechanism for achieving managerial
accountability. Upon concluding that investors are entitled to the wealth and
governance benefits of takeovers, courts must delineate the reach of their claim,
either confining it to instances where directors acknowledge the break-up of the
company as in Revlon, or requiring value-maximizing behavior, if not at all
times, at least from the point when an unsolicited offer is made. While there
may be no logical reason to assign directors the role of "auctioneer" only when
they concede a company's inevitable dismantling, as courts deal with this next
level of issues they may find that continued insistence on shareholder welfare
as the primary purpose of corporate activity becomes, in the takeover setting
at least, somewhat troubling.
This is an issue that goes to the very heart of corporate governance, indeed
to the very heart of corporate capitalism. Given the undeniable impact of large
corporations on multiple constituencies and the very mixed evidence on the
overall economic utility of takeover transactions, 9o courts may be reluctant to
(CCH) 93,764, at 98,586-87 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988). The Delaware Chancery Court also has
upheld a target board's payment of a "topping fee" and expenses to one bidder where the board
in good faith could conclude that the payment was in the shareholders' best interests by keeping
the bidder actively involved in the Revlon-style auction process. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781-82 (Del. Ch. 1988).
90. There is considerable evidence that shareholders of target companies profit from corporate
takeovers. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Many economists interpret the favorable price
performance of target companies' stock to imply efficiency gains from takeovers as well. See infra
note 154 and accompanying text. More direct evidence on the efficiency outcomes of many mergers,
however, casts some doubt on whether such acquisitions generally are efficiency-enhancing. Professor
F.M. Scherer and Mr. David Ravenscraft have assembled substantial direct evidence on mergers
showing that acquired companies during the 1960s and early 1970s were, on average, highly profitable
before acquisition and that, after acquisition, often experienced a decline in profitability. D. RAVENS-
CRAFr & F. SCHERER, MERGERS AND MANAGERIAL PERfoRMANcE 2-3, 12-13 (Dec. 1985) (working
paper, copy available at Journal of Corporation Law office). When tender offer acquisitions were
isolated from their data, similar outcomes were found. D. RAVENsCRAFT & F. SCHERER, LtsE AFTER
TAKEOVER 12-13 (Sept. 1986) (working paper, copy available at Journal of Corporation Law office).
Ravenscraft and Scherer also found that pretakeover profitability of targets was only "slightly
inferior" to that of industry peers, thus calling into question the hypothesis that hostile takeovers
are directed at incompetent management. Scherer and Ravenscraft conclude that their findings are
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describe management's responsibilities so narrowly-auctioneers, no less-while
being unable to say exactly why, in a culture and body of law where the rhetoric
of economic orthodoxy is so deeply ingrained, shareholder-"owners" ought not
do with the company as they wish, whatever the consequences for others having
intimate connections with a business. Courts may not be the body best suited
to resolve these matters, but because they repeatedly are called on to assess the
propriety of management's behavior, they eventually must confront these elemental
questions.
Second, the court in Revlon stated a principle that it may have intended
for general application: "A board may have regard for various constituencies
in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders." 9' This element of balance in the modified business
judgment rule, originating in Unocal,92 will require directors to demonstrate that
defensive measures will lead to specific identifiable benefits for shareholders,
rather than simply being in the best interests of the corporation. The precise
meaning of "benefits," however, is unclear. It might be interpreted to mean
that once a takeover attempt begins, shareholders cannot be denied the opportunity
to realize immediate takeover-generated premiums as maximized by management's
auctioneering efforts. Even further, it may mean that defensive measures adopted
prior to a takeover bid might themselves be suspect if they serve to reduce the
frequency, as well as the likelihood of success, of takeover attempts without
also providing a recognizable off-setting benefit to investors. Alternatively, the
term simply may be construed to mean the opportunity to remain as an investor
in the company as operated presently and over the long-run. Once again,
resolution of this issue will require courts to address explicitly the nature of
the investors' claim on corporate activity.
Third, reviewing defensive tactics for their impact on the bidding process
for a corporation's stock provides a standard of propriety, almost an outcome-
oriented measure of the very kind that so distressingly is absent when judges
review operating decisions. Simply put, because "[miarket forces must be allowed
"hard to square with the hypothesis that conglomerate mergers were on balance efficiency-increasing."
D. RAVENSCRAFr & F. SCHERER, MERGERS AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE, supra, at 37. They also
suggest that the "hypothesis that tender offer acquisitions are on average efficiency-increasing warrants
much more skepticism than it has received thus far in the literatures of economics, corporate finance,
and securities law." D. RAVENSCRAFr & F. SCHERER, Ln'E AFrER TAKEOVER, supra, at 13.
In another recent study, Professors Herman and Lowenstein, having examined 56 hostile tender
offers initiated between 1975 and 1983, also found a significant decline in the acquired company's
postmerger financial performance and concluded that hostile takeovers do not necessarily lead to
efficiency gains. Herman & Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers: An Empirical
Study 19-26 (Nov. 1985) (an unpublished study in proceedings of Columbia University's Center for
Law and Economic Studies' Conference on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, copy
available at Journal of Corporation Law office).
These studies, while employing methodologies that might be questioned, at least raise some
doubt as to whether only inefficiently managed companies are acquisition targets or whether there
are always useful "synergies" in a takeover. They also raise a serious question as to whether
acquirors are serving larger societal interests by "breaking up" or possibly mismanaging what may
have been reasonably well-run businesses.
91. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(emphasis added).
92. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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to operate freely to bring the target's shareholders the best price available . . .,93
actions that inhibit this, as the lock-up option did in Revlon, are improper,
while actions that enhance this, as the redeemable poison pill did in Revlon,
are appropriate. Strict adherence to this perspective would require proof that
defensive measures adopted both before and during a takeover attempt did not
impede the workings of the financial markets and deflect their benefits away
from investors. 94 After all, if market forces are to operate fully, then investors
should receive all available advantages of the capital market. Thus, while it is
relatively uncontroversial to assert that actual pending takeover bids must be
responded to in a manner that yields the maximum return to investors, logically,
if "[m]arket forces must be allowed to operate freely," 9 then an even bolder
proposition might be made: defensive measures that are likely to reduce the
frequency of takeover bids are improper unless the potential reduction in the
number of bids is offset by the benefit to shareholders of strengthening
management's ability to deploy those measures to maximize shareholder gains
once a bid is launched. Sorting out this issue and evaluating defensive measures
in terms of their effect on fostering either a free market only for already-
commenced corporate control contests or also for initiating such contests will
not be easy.96 Nonetheless, it may be an appealing benchmark as courts struggle
to articulate a conceptual framework for reconciling management duty and
shareholder rights.
93. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
94. See Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987). In Buckhorn,
the court noted that in adopting a poison pill rights plan and establishing its "trigger price" the
"directors were making a decision which would effectively preempt the marketplace, [and therefore]
they assumed a great deal of responsibility which made it imperative that they make an informed
decision concerning the value of Buckhorn stock." Id. at 230. Because the target directors failed
to meet their burden of proving that they had made an informed business judgment in setting the
trigger price, the court enjoined implementation of the plan. Id. at 231; see also cases cited supra
note 89.
95. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
96. One difficulty in evaluating defensive measures in terms of their effect on the bidding
process, especially given the difficulty of complying with Jarrell's finding that target management
should resist but not to the point of defeating a hostile bid, see Jarrell, supra note 10, at 151, is
made clear by Judge Guy's dissenting opinion in Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th
Cir. 1986). Judge Guy pointed out that no target company shareholders objected to the degree of
resistance used in that contest, and that continued resistance required "an evaluation of the upside
benefit of getting perhaps a dollar more per share versus the downside benefit of possibly losing
the white knight in the process." Id. at 888. If courts continue to require premium-maximizing
behavior they will have to respond to Judge Guy's valid concern.
A recent example of a court giving directors some latitude in evaluating the economics of
competing bids is Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,915, at 90,103 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988), where the Court upheld a board's
decision to accept an immediate $66 per share cash offer over a contingent $70, not all cash, offer.
Another recent instance is In re Fort Howard Litig., C.A. 9991 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) where the
court upheld a management buy-out as consistent with its Revlon auction duty, reasoning that a
board may favor one bidder over another if, in good faith, it believes shareholder interests are
thereby advanced. See also Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 577 (lth Cir.
1988) (where the court held that target directors may consider factors other than the cash offer
price in determining the adequacy of a tender offer). These cases mean, in effect, that even though
a target board may be required to conduct an auction, the exercise of board judgment in the auction
context itself may be subject to limited review.
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Finally, emphasis on director duty to shareholders rather than to the company
increasingly is prominent in decisions reviewing management's takeover conduct.
The last portion of the Revlon opinion completely abandons the customary
"corporation and its shareholders" phrase and refers only to management's duty
to shareholders. 97 The effect of defensive measures on shareholder participation
in corporate governance clearly was of concern to the Norlin and Minstar courts,
however misguided and incomplete the courts' analyses. 98 Recently, the Sixth,
Second, and Seventh Circuits, in striking down a management buy-out,
99 a lock-
up option, 100 and a poison pill rights plan,101 respectively, expressed obvious
concern for the effect of these defensive measures on shareholder well-being.
The Sixth Circuit made it clear that in reviewing the propriety of a management
buy-out that sought to end an unwelcome takeover attempt, the court's function
was to determine whether the target corporation's board of directors had fulfilled
its fiduciary duty to shareholders to obtain the highest premium for their stock.
1 02
The Second Circuit considered the challenged lock-up option to affect shareholders
adversely by both dampening the bidding process and impinging on investor
governance rights.' °3 The court stated that a director's fiduciary obligation is
"to protect the financial interests of the corporation, and thereby the
shareholders .... When engaging in defensive maneuvers, .. . a director's
obligation is to ensure the overall fairness ... to the shareholders."'04 In the
Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner, in striking down a target company's poison pill,
was clearer in expressing the fiduciary duty of directors as running exclusively
to the shareholders:
It is supposed to be the shareholders' company, for it is they who
are entitled to all the income that the company generates after paying
off all contractually or otherwise obligated expenses. The officers and
directors are the agents and fiduciaries of the shareholders and owe
a duty of complete loyalty which is inconsistent with erecting insuperable
barriers to hostile takeovers.'0 5
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
99. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
100. Hanson Trust PLC, HSCM v. ML/SECM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
101. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
102. Edelman, 798 F.2d at 886-87.
103. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 281.
104. Id. at 277-78.
105. Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d at 254. As a result of Judge Posner's opinion, CTS Cor-
poration's board later implemented a different flip-in poison pill in connection with a professed
determination to sell the company. The company was valued at $50 per share and the plan was
designed to self-destruct if an offer of $50 or more per share was made. When reviewing the new
plan, Judge Posner expressed concern about the chilling effect of such a plan on possible tender
offers at a price below $50 per share, such an offer most likely being made by Dynamics Corp.
which already held a 27.5% stake. He feared that in spite of the directors' statement of intent to
sell the company, a $50 price might be unreasonably high, and thus effectively would allow the
board not to fulfill its Revlon duty to auction the company. Therefore, he remanded the case for
yet further evidence on the reasonableness of the $50 reservation price. Dynamics Corp. of Am.
v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
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The lower courts also have been quick to adopt Revlon's renewed focus
on shareholder welfare. In Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. N.L. Industries,' 6 a
federal district court enjoined a "flip-in" poison pill rights plan that became
nonredeemable after twenty percent of the target company's stock had been
acquired. The court apparently believed that share ownership carries with it the
entitlement to receive tender offers, and stated that the plan's lack of redeemability
would "prevent stockholders from receiving tender offers. ."... Furthermore,
the court stated that investors "are entitled to exercise their own value judgments
with respect to the worth or lack of worth of the offer. . . .. 0 Thus, the court
strongly implied that both the opportunity to receive takeover bids offering stock
premiums and the unimpaired power to accept or reject that opportunity are
attributes inherent in share ownership.
In A.C. Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,'09 a bidder who had
made a cash offer of fifty-six dollars per share for all, but not less than a
majority, of the target company's stock sought to enjoin the target from
implementing a partial self-tender for sixty-five percent of its stock at sixty
dollars per share and from issuing stock to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan.
The Delaware Chancery Court, stating that it was applying Unocal's two-pronged
test of defensive measures, o10 first held that by seeking to create an alternative
investment for shareholders the target's plan served a valid corporate purpose.
In asking whether the defensive tactic was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed,""' the court went on to observe, however, that because the target's offer
had to be accepted prior to the expiration of the hostile bid, the target's actions
were highly coercive and, in fact, did not create a viable alternative for shareholders.
As a result, the court held that the target company's action was not "fair to
shareholders"12 and thus, the board of directors had breached its "legal duty
to its shareholders to exercise its judgment to promote the stockholders' interests.""t 3
While the Chancery Court's initial reference to the corporate purpose standard
shows the usual confusion as to the proper beneficiary of management duty,
later language, as well as the outcome of the case, makes it clear that if a
target board purports to act on specific behalf of the shareholders it must in
fact create a meaningful choice for them, the corporate entity being irrelevant.
Further, the upshot of A.C. Acquisitions is that the shareholder's unobstructed
right to choose is the preeminent factor in a takeover; and it is possible that
no threat to the corporate entity can justify foreclosing the exercise of that
choice."14 So viewed, the second step of Unocal's modified business judgment
rule adds nothing to judicial review of defensive measures, and Delaware courts
should state forthrightly that shareholder interests now are determinative.
106. 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
107. Id. at 1238.
108. Id. at 1239.
109. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
110. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
111. A. C. Acquistions, 519 A.2d at 113.
112. Id. at 115.
113. Id. at 114 n.12.
114. At one point in the opinion, the court applies the Unocal "reasonableness" test expressly
in terms of "threat posed to stockholders," whereas Unocal referred to the threat to the "cor-
poration." Compare id. at 114 with Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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Even decisions upholding various defensive measures show the heightened
attention to shareholder well-being sought by the court in Revlon. In Samjens
Partners I v. Burlington Industries,"
5 the offeror sought to enjoin the target
company from entering a merger agreement with a third party. In denying
injunctive relief, the court held that the target board had carried out its Revlon
obligations to auction the company because the merger agreement actually prompted
further bids from both the offeror and the third party.
In Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners,"
6 the offeror argued that its all-cash
offer for the target's stock had transformed the target board into a Revlon
auctioneer with the responsibility of obtaining the highest price for shareholders
to the exclusion of all other considerations. The court acknowledged that such
was the case if there were multiple bidders
1
7 -a concession that goes beyond
the narrow holding of Revlon, because the court there reached that conclusion
only when the target board had determined that a sale of the company was
inevitable-but not where the board of directors believed its own restructuring
and self-tender program, initiated prior to the hostile offer, would "yield superior
long-term benefits for its shareholders .. ".."I's Finding the latter in the case
before it, the court refused to grant the injunction.
The Gelco case may mean that auctioning can be avoided and that target
management can consider the noninvestor factors referred to in Unocal if it
had the foresight to implement the same value-enhancing measures as a later
bidder itself might have done upon attaining control. By such "preemptive"
action, significant value immediately is distributed to shareholders and the corporate
entity is restructured-oftentimes drastically-just as in an auction followed by
a break-up of the company. The difference is that incumbent management remains
in control of the corporation. In short, to retain its position and prevent a
hostile bid that may require it to auction the company, management seeks to
give shareholders essentially what "market forces," the new standard of
performance, would have provided-a generous payment. Thus, by influencing
management to behave in such a way as to avoid its application, the Revlon
decision, nonetheless, may serve the interests of shareholders.
'19
115. 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
116. 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th
Cir. 1987).
117. Id. at 847.
118. Id. at 850.
119. It is clear that heightened judicial scrutiny of defensive measures generally, and the Revlon
auction concept more particularly, has influenced the behavior of corporate management. Managers
themselves, though perhaps reluctantly, often speak of auctioning the companies they manage. For
example, in a letter to Campeau Corp., which had launched a hostile bid for Federated Department
Stores, Inc., the board of Federated, having received competing bids from Campeau and R.H.
Macy & Co., stated as follows: "The auction has continued for some time now, and the board
believes it is in the interests of all constituencies that it be brought to a conclusion." Federated
Board Sets Vote on 2 Suitors' Final Bids, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1988, at 6, col 1. In fact, the
contest continued, and was resolved by Campeau making the high bid. Also, in commenting on
the current takeover environment, H. Brewster Atwater, Chairman of General Mills, Inc. and head
of a takeover task force at the Business Roundtable, stated: "You're seeing the creation of a new
auction market." Coll, Rules Are Changing in Wall Street's Takeover Game, Wash. Post, Apr. 3,
1988, at HI, col. 1.
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A similar defensive recapitalization was upheld in British Printing &
Communication Corp. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.'20 In British Printing,
the offeror proposed a merger with the target company that would pay the
target shareholders forty-four dollars cash per share. On advice of its investment
bankers and after several meetings, the target board ultimately rejected that
proposal in favor of a recapitalization that would pay shareholders forty dollars
in cash, distribute to them one share of preferred stock valued at ten dollars,
and allow them to retain part of their common stock in anticipation of future
company growth. The target board also authorized the issuance of convertible
preferred stock to an ESOP. The special dividend plan required a $2,500,000,000
loan, the repayment of which would necessitate a severe cost-reduction program.
Moreover, transactional costs for the loan were substantial-approximately
$125,000,000 to $130,000,000. The court refused to enjoin the recapitalization,
holding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated target director breach of either
the duty of care or loyalty because future takeover attempts had not been
frustrated completely as the plaintiffs had alleged. While the court employed
the traditional rhetoric of purporting to examine compliance with duties to
"corporation and shareholders," the underlying result is that the target board
simply preempted the bidder by taking essentially the same value-increasing
measures as the plaintiff itself might have adopted. Thus, as in Gelco, a Revlon
auction was averted, but the corporate entity and its constituent relationships
were altered dramatically because target management no longer could preserve
them in their pretakeover condition. Instead, responding to market forces,
management was constrained to distribute substantial value to shareholders. 2,
In sum, many courts reviewing takeover behavior still employ a rhetoric
that fails to clarify whether and how corporate management's duty to the
corporation differs from its duty to adhere to the tenets of orthodoxy and
maximize shareholder wealth. However, in result and increasingly in their language
and discourse, courts at last are sharpening their focus on shareholder well-
being, thereby moving to align management duty with corporate purpose.
III. LEGISLATIVE ExPREsSIoNs OF CORPORATE PURPOSE AND MANAGEMENT
CONDUCT
A. Corporate Statutes Before the Takeover Phenomenon
Perhaps surprisingly, corporate statutes do not expressly address the issue
of corporate objective.1 22 Thus, nowhere in these statutes is it stated that entities
120. 664 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
121. When the recapitalization plan was adopted, the company intended to finance the huge
resulting indebtedness by massive cost-cutting measures and by consolidating certain of its publishing
businesses. Knobelsdorff, Cost-Cutting Alone Won't Fill Harcourt's Battle-Drained Coffers, Christian
Science Monitor, Aug. 21, 1987, at 11, col. 1. Instead, however, the company now is "auctioning
off its profitable magazine unit-part of its core publishing business-and selling $140 million of
undeveloped real estate." Id. For a decision enjoining a preemptive restructuring plan on the ground
that it was a "manifestly unreasonable" response to the takeover threat because it was inferior
economically to the bidder's offer, done without shareholder approval, and would serve to shift
effective control to incumbent management, see Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, [Current
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924, at 90,199 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1988).
122. Section 2.01 of the American Law Institute's PRINCItPES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANcE:
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formed thereunder must or should seek to maximize profits or shareholder
wealth, or pursue any other particular end. Furthermore, until recently, corporate
statutes did not prescribe the duties of corporate management, choosing instead
to leave that task to decisional law. 23 Currently, those statutes that do formulate
corporate management's duty do so in very general terms, almost invariably
stating that management is to act in the "best interests" of the "corporation."'
1 24
Although modern corporate statutes do not deal with corporate objectives,
and would face formidable obstacles in attempting to do so, it seems clear that
states have the power explicitly to insist that corporate conduct inure either to
shareholder well-being or to some broader notion of public good. This sounds
very strange to the modern ear, particularly in a free enterprise system where
liberty of contract is so highly valued, and where relatively unhindered corporations
have played such an important-even indispensable-role in our remarkable
material development. It also seems a bit quaint and out of fashion in view of
the "contractual" model of corporate law subscribed to by so many contemporary
corporate scholars. Still, there are two related reasons why states possess this
authority. First, a corporation may come into existence only by the act-whether
special or general-of a sovereign power.
2 Without formal state action, however
routine and ministerial it may have become under modern statutes, corporate
status is impossible. Second, and to take a less reified view of corporate existence,
incorporation laws confer rights and privileges'26-e.g., limited liability and
perpetual duration-on corporate participants that naturally are not held by
individuals or partnerships, and that are attainable by private bargaining, if at
all, only at great expense. 27 It is possible then, at least in theory, if not in
fashion, 12 for states to condition the grant of such rights and privileges on the
ANALYsIs AND RECOMENDATIONS, while not a statute is, nonetheless, an attempt to articulate succinctly
the parameters of corporate activity. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. That section,
tentatively approved by the ALI in 1984, generated a great deal of controversy. Schwartz, Objective
and Conduct of the Corporation: Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's
Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 511, 511 (1984).
123. The MODEL BusitEss CoRPoRATiON ACT contained no such provision until 1974, when
it added § 35, now superseded by § 8.30 of the Revised Act. Delaware still does not have a statute
that defines corporate management's duties. Its indemnification section, however, requires that a
person seeking indemnification must have acted in a manner he or she "reasonably believed to be
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation .. " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)
(1986). See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS Ch. 9, § 232, at 612-20
(1986) (discussing definition of the duties of corporate management by case law and statute).
124. See, e.g., MODEL BuSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.30 (1984). But see N.C. Bus. CORP.
ACT § 55-35 (Michie 1982) (directors stand in "fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its
shareholders").
125. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819) ("The power of creating
a corporation, is one appertaining to sovereignty .... "); Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 634 (1819) ("A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.").
126. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 634 ("Being the mere creature of law, it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence.").
127. R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 291-92.
128. This so-called "concession theory" of the corporation is described in Hessen, A New
Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1327-
28 (1979). Hessen takes issue with the theory by asserting that corporate participants do not receive
rights and privileges from the state that are not attainable by private arrangement. That analysis,
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assurance-however enforced-that they will be exercised for the public good,
even if doing so proves detrimental to shareholders.' 29 Less ambitiously, states
simply might require that these rights and privileges not be used to pursue
certain proscribed activities regarded from time to time as inimical to the public
interest, again even if those activities would be advantageous to investors.
The implications of this authority for state influence, even control, over
corporate business affairs are profound, and could be expected to meet substantial
resistance if some concrete and far-reaching expression of them seriously were
proposed. Yet, early in the history of business corporations, states forthrightly
availed themselves of this power and exercised tight control over the granting
of corporate charters,'3 0 initially issuing them on a case by case basis with strict
conditions, 3 ' and only when "necessary in order to procure for the community
some specific benefit otherwise unattainable." 3 2 Even after the passage of general
incorporation statutes, corporations still were "presumed to be incorporated for
the benefit of the public."'3
The passage of general incorporation statutes, however, did mark a significant
transformation in legislative attitudes toward corporations. Instead of being
viewed with the distrust and fear of earlier days, corporations were regarded
more favorably. Not only did they provide the material benefits that accompany
exceptional economic growth, the' very process of chartering corporations was
a boon to state treasuries. 3 4 These twin benefits led to the well-known trend,
continuing today, whereby many states compete with each other in providing
both congenial corporate statutes' and hospitable business climates. Because- it
is management and its legal counsel that fulfill the critical function of selecting
the state of incorporation (or reincorporation), corporate statutes must appeal
to them. 36 The result is the widespread adoption of corporate statutes having
however, ignores the substantial time and transactions costs associated with such private arrangements,
both of which are reduced by the ready-made nature of corporate statutes automatically conferring
certain privileges. See R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 291-92.
129. Professor Dodd extended this idea to business generally: "Business . . .is private property
only in a qualified sense, and society may properly demand that it be carried on in such a way
as to safeguard the interests of those who deal with it either as employees or consumers even if
the proprietary rights of its owners are thereby curtailed." Dodd, supra note 29, at 1162.
130. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 123, at 23-26.
131. Id. at 25-26 ("The [incorporation] privilege at first was circumscribed with limitations
and requirements as to permissible purposes, maximum authorized capital, minimum paid-in capital,
par value, trust fund theory, limited duration, residence of incorporaters and directors, maximum
indebtedness, powers, etc."); see also Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549-56 (1933) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (Stating that "[t]he general laws, which long embodied severe restrictions upon size
and upon the scope of corporate activity, were, in part, an expression of the desire for equality
of opportunity.").
132. Lee, 288 U.S. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also A.P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow, 13
N.J. 145, 149, 98 A.2d 581, 583 (1953).
133. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906); see also Dodd, supra note 29, at 1149. The
development of new ways of thinking about corporate law matters, especially the emergence of the
contractual and "market" model, has led to a kind of collective forgetting or denial of, even
embarassment over, this early stage in corporate law. The same has occurred with antitrust law.
See Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, S. CAL. L. REV. 1219 (1988).
134. Lee, 288 U.S. at 557, 559-60 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 558-59 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663-66 (1974).
136. Although corporate statutes must appeal to corporate management, that is not to say
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as their philosophy the facilitating and enabling of corporate activity, rather
than the goal of impeding or regulating such activity.'37
Moreover, modem corporate statutes do not deal with the totality of corporate
behavior. They simply order-in a fairly general way-the relationship between
those who provide capital (shareholders and, to a limited extent, creditors) and
those who manage the enterprise. The relationship of employees, consumers,
and the public at large to the corporation is determined largely by contract, or
has become the subject of special legislation. 38 In short, throughout the twentieth
century noninvestor groups universally have been regarded as standing outside
the governance structure erected by corporate statutes.
Contemporary corporate statutes then have no explicit requirement that
serving the public good is either a quid pro quo for the initial grant of corporate
status and its privileges or, once granted, a mandatory objective of corporate
endeavor. Instead, it is presumed that the public good is served well by chartering
large numbers of corporations which, in pursuing profits and shareholder well-
being, will provide satisfying jobs, useful products and services, and sustainable
economic growth. By aligning the egoistic pursuit of profits with the general
good in this manner, the utilitarian underpinnings of economic orthodoxy find
expression in the complex, collective activities made possible by the corporate
form, as well as in the relatively simple enterprises conducted by individuals.
Such a neat resolution of the investor's claim on the corporation-a claim not
strictly analogous to that of a capital-providing sole proprietor on his or her
enterprise-and the larger community's claim on a once feared institution also
serves to justify corporate statutes that ignore all relationships except that of
capital providers to capital managers, and even explains why such statutes have
been skewed to the apparent advantage of management. If the public good is
identified with material well-being and the efficient use of economic resources,
then management's free reign in pursuing profits on behalf of shareholders
becomes the "visible hand" which will guide society to that end.
3 9
In spite of the unparalleled economic prosperity of the early and mid-
twentieth century, or perhaps because of the awesome power it afforded corporate
management, there was and is a gnawing concern about whether corporate
its choice of incorproation (or reincorporation) is unconstrained. One commentator has argued that
if a state's corporate laws were adverse to investors, the company's share price would fall relative
to comparable companies incorporated in states having laws more favorable to investors. Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEOAL STUD. 251, 255
(1977). Thus, on the assumption that efficient capital markets impound the regulatory regime into
a corporation's stock price, the threat of takeover and job loss accompanying a share price decline
will motivate management to select states having laws conducive to share price maximization. Id.
at 265. For a critical assessment of this theory of "market charter competition," see Romano, The
State Competition Debate In Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 709, 710-17 (1987).
137. "Flexibility" for management in the operation of the corporation is the hallmark of
many modern corporate statutes, including the recently revised MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT.
See Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1455, 1455 (1986). For a critique of the
MODEL BUSIESS CORPORATION ACT's "flexibility" rationale, see Branson, Countertrends in Cor-
poration Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, And
Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REv. 53, 91-95 (1983).
138. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
139. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSIESS 1 (1977).
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behavior adequately satisfies the expectations of either shareholders' 40 or various
noninvestor groups. While the corporate governance movement aims to rectify
this potentially embarrassing situation by improving the position of diffuse capital
providers in relation to managers, and by reestablishing the primacy of their
claim on corporate endeavor, the still-burgeoning corporate responsibility movement
seeks to make corporate conduct more responsive to a host of noninvestor
concerns. 41 Interestingly, although they share a deep concern about corporate
management's broad and potentially unaccountable power, these two movements
have never been linked together. Undoubtedly each group perceives that
management unfairly modulates its claims on the corporation in favor of the
other. Thus, while both would like to rechannel management's discretion, they
would do so in diametrically opposite directions. Investors would favor stricter
allegiance to their desires, while noninvestors would seek to broaden the corporate
outlook. The result is that little serious attention has been given to achieving
socially more responsible action by tampering with the internal governance
structure of the corporation. 42 The inside of the corporation remains the inviolate
province of shareholders and management. 43
B. States Respond to Takeovers
The hostile takeover phenomenon, little known before the 1960s, has a
significant connection to both corporate governance and responsibility. As to
governance, many believe, with an almost detectable sense of relief, that the
"market for corporate control," first fully described by Dean Manne in 1965,1
may be the long-awaited mechanism for finally securing meaningful management
accountability and for returning shareholders to their rightful place of importance
140. For an excellent discussion of the manner in which the modern shareholder remains
vulnerable to the exercise of management discretion, see Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers
in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1671 (1985).
141. See Stone, supra note 17, at 570; see also sources cited supra note 14.
142. Professor Stone believes that the failure to propose concrete methods of institutional
reform is the major weakness of much of the literature on corporate responsibility. Stone, supra
note 17, at 558-59.
143. Several years ago, Professor Chayes sought to articulate a more expansive notion of
corporate membership:
A more spacious conception of [corporate] "membership," and one closer to the facts
of corporate life, would include all those having a relation of sufficient intimacy with
the corporation or subject to its power in a sufficiently specialized way. Their rightful
share in decisions on the exercise of corporate power would be exercised through an
institutional arrangement appropriately designed to represent the interests of a con-
stituency of members having a significant common relation to the corporation and its
power. It is not always easy to identify such constituencies nor is it always clear what
institutional forms are appropriate for recognizing their interests. The effort to answer
those questions is among the most meaningful tasks of the American legal system.
Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY
41 (E. Mason ed. 1959). It is fair to say that Chayes' idea has not been implemented, and that
little if anything has been done to formalize the relationship of various noninvestor constituencies
to the internal governance of the American corporation. Nonetheless, it is an idea that continues
to be advanced in various forms. See commentators cited supra note 14.
144. Manne, supra note 44, at 112.
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in the corporation. 45 In a sense, just as noninvestor interests had become foreign
to corporate law, investors themselves, frustrated at traditional corporate law's
seeming inability to safeguard their interests, looked beyond that law to market-
based protection. That in turn has led some scholars to take a more market-
oriented and less rules centered view of corporate law.
Except for common-law fiduciary principles, cash tender offers were
unregulated until 1968,146 when Congress passed the Williams Act 47 as an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.148 Because the major purpose
of the federal securities laws is maintaining fair and honest capital markets,
149
their intended beneficiary is, naturally enough, the investor. In keeping with
this philosophy of investor protection, Congress sought to ensure that target
company shareholders could decide the outcome of takeover contests after full
disclosure from, but without excessive influence by, the bidder and target
management. It strove to be neutral between bidder and target.'50 It has never
been altogether clear whether Congress intended unimpaired financial markets
to be the exclusive means for protecting investors so that state regulation could
not upset that approach, or whether it sought only to establish a minimum
degree of protection that states were free to exceed, perhaps even by taking a
nonmarket approach to that objective.' What always has been clear, however,
is that shareholders were the chosen beneficiaries of the legislation, and that
they were to decide a target company's fate by acting out of a self-interest that,
ideally, also would work for the general good.
145. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 2, at 841 ("Indeed, ... the market for corporate control
may be the only potentially serious force for limiting management discretion."); Weiss, Economic
Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALl Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27
(1984) ("[T]he market for corporate control in general, and tender offers in particular, are the
most important disciplinary factors in the corporate governance system, and should be encouraged.").
146. The one legislative exception is Virginia. It passed a takeover statute in 1968, just before
Congress acted. 1968 Va. Acts. ch. 119, §§ 13.1-528 to -540.
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
148. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
149. Id. § 78b.
150. Senator Williams made this point when he introduced the bill: "Every effort has been
made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of
the offeror. The purpose of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to
fairly present their case." 113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1,
28 (1977) ("The legislative history ... shows that Congress was intent upon regulating takeover
bidders, theretofore operating covertly, in order to protect the shareholders of target companies.").
For a brief summary of the disclosure and other provisions of the Williams Act, see CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644 (1987).
151. For a collection of the decisions and commentary subscribing to one or the other of
these views, see Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REv. 203, 217-19 (1987). In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), a plurality of Justices
sought to resolve this matter by stating that because "Congress intended for investors to be free
to make their own decisions . . . [t]he state thus offers investor protection at the expense of investor
autonomy-an approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." Id. at 639-40 (emphasis
added). The exact status of the MITE plurality statement is somewhat in doubt after CTS Corp.,
however, because the Court in CTS emphasized that while its opinion "passes muster" under MITE,
the court was not "bound by its reasoning." CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645. For a detailed treatment
of the Williams Act's aims and the current preemption of state takeover statutes controversy, see
Johnson & Millon, Misreading The Williams Act (Unpublished Manuscript 1988).
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While state corporate statutes in 1968 may have been fairly accommodating
to corporate management, nothing in the design or rhetoric of those statutes
contradicted the Williams Act's key assumption that, ultimately, shareholders,
as owners of the corporation, should decide the corporation's basic direction.
Nonetheless, although accepting in theory the centrality of the investors' position
in corporate affairs and appreciating the need to redress the imbalance in their
relationship to management, states also saw a different side of the rampant
takeover activity-the social responsibility side-and began to question whether
attaining takeover benefits for shareholders was as consistent with other important
interests as economic and legal orthodoxy presumed.
States recognized that takeover battles may benefit bidders5 2 and financial
intermediaries, and undoubtedly are good for target company shareholders, 5 3
both to enhance their wealth and as an effective, if blunt, governance mechanism.
Such contests might even fulfill the desire of society at large for a more efficient
use of economic resources. 54 States also perceived, however, that those benefits
all are likely to be realized by the residents of other states, leaving the economic
and social costs of corporate disruption to fall disproportionately on the state
having a substantial connection to the target company. Feared costs include the
closing or moving of corporate headquarters and plants, with a resulting loss
of employment by workers, loss of income, property and sales tax revenues by
the state, reduction of charitable contributions to dependent nonprofit
organizations, and loss to the target company's web of suppliers, dealers, and
customers.' 5 Undaunted by the absence of solid evidence that takeovers actually
152. For evidence that takeover contests do not always benefit bidders, see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
153. Id.
154. Professor Demsetz has testified that "takeovers and tender offers serve the interests of
both shareholders and the nation." Securities and Exchange Commission Proceedings: Economic
Forum on Tender Offers 16 (Feb. 20, 1985) (copy on file at Journal of Corporation Law office).
The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers for 1985 also concluded that takeovers
both increase national wealth and enhance shareholder well-being. "The available evidence, however,
is that mergers and acquisitions increase national wealth. They improve efficiency, transfer scarce
resources to higher valued uses, and stimulate effective corporate management .... The evidence
is overwhelming that successful takeovers substantially increase the wealth of stockholders in target
companies." EcoNowc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, transmitted to Congress together with the ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COUNCH, OF EcONomc ADVISORS 196-97 (Feb. 1985).
155. See, e.g., the preamble to Act of May 1, 1987, ch. 124, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 1, which
states:
Whereas, takeovers and takeover attempts of corporations in North Carolina have
been occurring with increasing frequency; and
Whereas, such activity can be highly disruptive to communities within North
Carolina by causing, among other things, high unemployment and erosion of the State
and local economy and tax base; and
Whereas, many of these corporations are not presently subject to the North Carolina
Shareholder Protection Act since while substantially present in North Carolina they
are chartered elsewhere; and
Whereas, these corporations offer employment to a large number of North Carolina
citizens who pay income taxes, property and other taxes in this State; and
Whereas, these corporations pay significant amounts of income taxes to North
Carolina; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial State and local property taxes; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial sales and use taxes in North Carolina;
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cause undesirable effects on noninvestors, 5
6 thirty-seven states, motivated by the
mere prospect of such economic displacement, and responding to the considerable
political influence wielded by corporate management,
5 7 enacted takeover legislation
by 1978.158
These "first generation" takeover statutes often required disclosures beyond
those imposed by the Williams Act, 5 9 sometimes well before the commencement
of a tender offer.' 60 Furthermore, state administrators frequently were authorized
to hold hearings on proposed offers and to prevent an offer from proceeding
if it was believed to be unfair or deficient in its disclosures.
1 6
1 Although a
principal motivation for such statutes was to protect noninvestors by precluding
free-market solutions to takeover contests, ironically, though not surprisingly
given the continuing hold of economic orthodoxy on discourse about corporate
and securities matters, their provisions often were couched in the conventional
language of shareholder protection. In 1982, however, the Supreme Court, in
Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,162 frustrated state objectives by striking down the Illinois
Business Takeover Act, 63 a typical statute. The Court, after uncritically reciting
the supposed salubrious effects of takeover activity on shareholder wealth,
corporate governance, and efficiency in the use of society's economic resources,'
64
held the Illinois Act to be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because
it imposed burdens on interstate commerce that were excessive in light of the
local interests the Illinois Act purported to further.
Given state goals of retaining businesses within their borders as independent
entities and of protecting those resident constituent interests that depend on the
continuation of management-formulated operating policies-aims that are quite
different from the pure investor protection policy of federal law-the critical
question facing state legislatures was whether MITE left any meaningful room
and
Whereas, these corporations provide their North Carolina employees with health,
retirement and other benefits; and
Whereas, these corporations and their employees contribute greatly to community
projects in North Carolina; and
Whereas, many unrelated businesses rely on these corporations to purchase goods
and services; and
Whereas, North Carolina has a vital interest in providing to these corporations
the benefits of the provisions of the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act; Now,
therefore ....
156. SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest recently asserted that hostile takeovers necessarily
do not cause job losses and other economic dislocation. He argued that even though there is
considerable "emotional appeal" to tying hostile takeovers to employee layoffs, "the logic of the
relationship between job loss and takeover activity simply does not support the political rhetoric."
Grundfest Challenges Argument That Takeovers Cause Job Losses, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
423 (1988).
157. See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 122
(1987).
158. A listing of those statutes is found in Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation
After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 457-58 n.4.
159. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-6-2(b) (1982) (repealed 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 803(2) (1964) (repealed 1985).
160. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-4(a) (1985) (thirty-day notice period).
161. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515.1(2) (Vernon 1979).
162. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
163. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.51-.70 (1981) (repealed 1983).
164. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
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for them to accomplish their objectives. Particularly encouraging for continued,
if narrowed, state involvement in regulating corporate takeovers were statements
in the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens. Joining in Justice
White's indirect burden on commerce analysis of the Illinois Act, Justice Powell
stated that he favored this position because its "reasoning leaves some room
for state regulation of tender offers. 1' 6  He acknowledged the importance of
corporations to the "general public interest" and recognized that significant
disruption of state and local economies can occur upon the relocation of corporate
headquarters.'6 Moreover, he appeared to endorse state laws aimed at protecting
noninvestors when he agreed with Justice Stevens that "the Williams Act's
neutrality policy does not necessarily imply a congressional intent to prohibit
state legislation designed to assure-at least in some circumstances-greater
protection to interests that include, but often are broader than, those of incumbent
management. "1 67 Although he did not elaborate, Justice Powell obviously believed
that because federal takeover policy simply did not address the concerns of
those persons who, while not investors or otherwise directly associated with the
capital markets, clearly have a significant stake in corporate activities, there
might be room for limited state action to protect those interests.
Certain states seized this perceived window of permissible action and turned
to their state corporate statutes as a constitutionally safe means of controlling
certain facets of a takeover. The chief rationale for utilizing corporate laws as
an avenue for regulating takeover activity stems from the notion that while
federal law regulates the interstate capital markets in which shareholders buy
and sell stock-an activity that in a sense is external to the corporate entity-
historically only state law governed the substance of a corporation's intracorporate
relationships-its "internal affairs."' 6 It was hoped that if a state's corporate
statutes somehow could be brought to bear on certain aspects of the takeover
process, a process that previously had taken place exclusively in the capital
markets and hence "outside" the corporation, perhaps states could bring, at
least partially, those transactions "inside" the entity where they could regulate
them, thereby circumventing the market-oriented, pro-investor philosophy of
federal law.
The decision to deploy corporate law as the vehicle for state influence on
takeover contests is ironic. Except for the very early years of business corporations,
states long had refrained from utilizing corporate statutes as an explicit means
of influencing corporations to seek the general public good. Perhaps recognizing
that states, constrained by economic orthodoxy's deep hold on corporate law,
largely had ceded the province of corporate law to the narrow investor-manager
relationship, defenders of these second generation statutes continue to speak in
the language of that law, and often argue that the statutes are "shareholder
protection" acts. 69 Such a defense is somewhat plausible for the "fair price"
165. Id. at 646.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 646-47.
168. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that "[clorporations
are creatures of state law and . . . except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities
of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
169. See, e.g., Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat,
Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CoRp. L. Rsv. 3, 34-35 (1984); Booth, The Promise
of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1635 (1988).
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statutes pioneered by Maryland because they had the limited aim of preventing
the shareholder coercion that often resulted from two-tier tender offers.
70 Even
here, however, the ability of the target board to opt out of the restrictions of
those statutes to accomplish a friendly business combination, or to engage in
its own discriminatory two-tier self-tender offer, makes that position and mode
of discourse highly questionable.'
7
1
The "control share acquisition" statute pioneered by Ohio 72 also initially
might be defended as a proshareholder statute because it affords shareholders
the same right to act with fellow shareholders in collectively approving or
disapproving a tender offer as they traditionally have had with respect to asset
sales and mergers. 173 Here, however, this purported ex post benefit to shareholders
once a takeover bid actually has been launched is offset by three factors. First,
historically, the decision to alienate one's stock has been an individual shareholder's
to make and, at least in public corporations, has been a right that largely has
gone unrestricted. Thus, a valuable incident of stock ownership is curtailed
substantially by control share statutes. Second, while collective rather than
individual shareholder action might minimize the coercion of a partial or two-
tier offer, the frequency of those kind of tender offers has declined dramatically
in the past few years. Third, while shareholders technically were enfranchised
to act collectively on the takeover issue, it seems clear that this was done, oddly,
so that shareholders would not gain the benefits of a takeover. Under Ohio's
version of the control share statute a purchase of stock that brings the buyer's
ownership of stock to or above certain thresholds first must be approved by a
vote of then existing shareholders. 74 Because a shareholder plebiscite does not
take place for up to fifty days the resulting delay, for a number of reasons,
might serve to defeat a hostile bid to the detriment of investors. With the
passage of time and resulting change in circumstances, such a bid might prove
to be mispriced or otherwise imprudent and, therefore, be withdrawn. 75 Also,
the carrying costs of retaining a financing commitment obviously increase with
the passage of time. Furthermore, there is a risk that additional bidders, friendly
or otherwise, who did not incur the "search costs" of the first bidder might
enter the contest during the interim. Such a risk may dissuade potential bidders
from even making initial offers. 76 Finally, and most importantly, delay provides
target management with the time needed to formulate and mount a takeover
defense, the assumption being that time increases the likelihood that such measures
will succeed. 77 All of these factors may serve, ex ante, to reduce the aggregate
170. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985); Romano, supra
note 157, at 118-19.
171. See Voran & Ponns-Townley, The Changing World of State Takeover Statutes (Part 3),
11 A.L.I. A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J. 121 (No. 4, 1987).
172. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
173. For a detailed description of how a control share acquisition statute is designed and
operates, see Johnson, supra note 5, at 195-97.
174. Id.
175. Romano, supra note 157, at 114-15 n.10.
176. Id.
177. Interestingly, these second-generation statutes were designed during a period-the early
to mid-1980s-when judicial review of defensive measures was fairly lax. Yet, as argued, see supra
notes 81-121 and accompanying text, courts have reversed field and are becoming much more critical
of management's takeover behavior. Consequently, the legislative strategy of providing management
with sufficient time to defeat a takeover attempt substantially may have been undermined by this
unexpected shift in judicial review.
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level of takeover activity, to the detriment of shareholders as a class.
These statutes then, while couched in the conventional rhetoric of investor
protection, in reality were designed to equip management to safeguard interests
more economically and politically significant to the chartering state. Toward
that end, state corporation statutes were amended to curtail the historic right
of shareholders freely to alienate their stock, thereby seeking to reduce investor
influence on the outcome of takeovers. In a sense, although legal orthodoxy
hardly permitted them to say so, states perceived that it was the shareholders
themselves, newly empowered by takeovers in their relationship to management
and having little concern for the social repercussions of their investment decisions,
who were the culprits. Such a view is neither a moral condemnation of investors,
nor does it reflect a belief that the goal of better management accountability
to investors, were it capable of achievement without undesirable consequences
for noninvestors, is undesirable. It is simply an appreciation of the fact that
while interstate capital markets highly are developed, thereby allowing capital
to gain almost instantaneously the highest available return by abandoning one
locale and enterprise for the good of another, other materials and talents used
by businesses are rooted more to place and move less readily.
However laudable it may be to protect those less mobile interests, in doing
so states not only deprive investors of a powerful mechanism for disciplining
management, they also inevitably open themselves to the charge that they are
being unduly parochial and protectionist. Even conceding that motive, however,
states might respond that they have a legitimate concern. Undoubtedly states
appreciate the ever-changing nature of modern economic activity, and that the
owners of today's valued resources and talents have no permanent claim on the
corporation. They also might believe, however, that these resources can, as
circumstances demand, be reallocated less abruptly than often occurs with takeovers,
thereby allowing resource owners to plan for and make a more thoughtful,
humane adaptation to inevitable change. Possessing no calculus or other mechanism
by which good, nondisruptive takeovers can be identified and allowed to proceed,
states simply hold that takeovers almost are uniformly unnecessary and damaging.
Happily, because the content of stock ownership rights always has been defined
by state corporate law, investors, unlike the out-of-state offerors in MITE who
clearly were beyond a state's constitutional reach, become an expedient lever
for dampening such activity. Thus, states are deploying their corporate laws to
sacrifice investor interests while, at the same time, claiming to protect them.17
Such improbity is unnecessary. While it is undeniable that corporate law
in the twentieth century has been narrowed to deal only with the relationship
between those who provide and those who manage capital, there is, as indicated
earlier,1 79 no inherent reason why a state corporate statute must be so limited.
A state, exercising its historic sovereign powers to insist that corporate activity
178. A recent study by the SEC's Office of the Chief Economist found that the passage of
Ohio's 1986 takeover law was accompanied by a drop in the share prices of Ohio corporations in
an amount equal to roughly two percent in value, and that the law appears to "redistribute wealth
from shareholders of Ohio firms to the incumbent managements and workers of these firms, residents
of Ohio." TIE OmCOF To a CHIEF ECONOMIST SEcuRns AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH EFFECTS OF Omo LEGISLATION AFFECTING TAKEOVERs 3, 23 (May 18, 1987).
179. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
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serve what it conceives, rightly or wrongly, as the general public good, might
assert simply that the ability of shareholders to alienate stock without limitation
is inimical to that goal and, as a result, must be abridged legislatively. This is
not to say, as some have, 80 that in a pristine, precorporate condition those
persons engaged in the private conduct of business are required by law or morals
to give one whit about the effect of their activities on others in society, except
as relevant markets require. The claim is more limited. It is simply that when
business participants seek the many advantages of the corporate form of
organization-advantages not inhering in citizenship-a state, the grantor of
corporate status, may impose limitations of a kind not applicable to extra-
corporate business activity, thereby effectively requiring the participants to
acknowledge the interests of others in a way that may exceed less pervasive
market constraints. Yet, because states long ago had eschewed the deliberate
attainment of the public good through their corporate statutes, and actually had
subscribed to the orthodox view that the unbridled pursuit of shareholder wealth
was more or less consonant with the public welfare, they were forced to distort
reality, asserting that their takeover laws, being corporate laws, actually helped
rather than hurt shareholders. Moreover, because Congress had taken a decidedly
proshareholder, market-oriented approach to takeover legislation in the Williams
Act, a state approach candidly aimed at harming investors and averting market
outcomes for the purpose of protecting other interests would present a much
starker preemption issue. The traditional power of states to regulate corporate
affairs would be tested severely had they not adopted a takeover strategy phrased,
however inaccurately, in terms of investor protection.
C. The Myth of Investor Protection and the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld Indiana's Control Share
Acquisition Statute against Commerce and Supremacy Clause attacks by analyzing
it as the shareholder protection act it purported to be.' 8' Indiana's statute was
modeled after Ohio's, but differed in one significant respect. Whereas Ohio's
statute prohibited the actual purchase of "control shares" without first obtaining
the consent of existing shareholders, s2 Indiana's statute did not forbid the
purchase as such, but provided that such shares carried voting rights only if
and to the extent granted by existing shareholders at a special meeting.' 83 Thus,
because shareholders collectively could decide whether to confer voting rights,
they effectively could decide whether acquisition of the shares, and thus control
of the corporation, would be achieved.
Justice Powell's opinion, first analyzing whether the Williams Act preempted
Indiana's law, was replete with references to the manner in which the statute's
requirement of a shareholder plebiscite purportedly benefited investors and thus
served the same goal as the Williams Act:
[Tjhe statute now before the Court protects the independent shareholder
against both of the contending parties . . . . By allowing such
180. See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 29, at 1148 n.7.
181. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
182. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985).
183. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-9(a) (Supp. 1986).
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shareholders to vote as a group, the Act protects them from the
coercive aspects of some tender offers . . . . The principal result of
the Act is to grant shareholders the power to deliberate collectively
about the merits of tender offers. This result is fully in accord with
the purposes of the Williams Act.8 4
Justice Powell also noted that a finding of preemption would mean a wide
variety of state corporate laws might also be preempted, particularly because
Indiana's law, unlike Ohio's, merely limited the voting attributes of stock
ownership, not the acquisition of stock itself. a5 He also rejected as unpersuasive
for preemption analysis the argument that by introducing up to a fifty-day delay
in a takeover transaction the statute afforded management the opportunity to
mount a takeover defense. 18 6 He stated that even if management took actions
"to diminish the value of the corporation's shares, . . ." the preemption analysis
would be unchanged because neither the "[Indiana] Act nor any other federal
statute can assure that shareholders do not suffer from the mismanagement of
corporate officers and directors."' 8 7 This assertion, however, was conspicuously
inconsistent with the larger thrust of his analysis that Indiana's statute was not
preempted by the Williams Act precisely because, supposedly, it did protect
shareholder interests. Moreover, it slid much too quickly over the troubling fact
that it is shareholder inability to discipline management for its perceived failings
in "diminish[ing] the value of the corporation's shares' ' by traditional legal
means-e.g., proxy contests or corporate derivative actions 8g9-that makes a
market-based mechanism like takeovers such an attractive governance instrument.
Finally, by emphasizing elsewhere in his opinion that Indiana's statute would
not "alter the balance between management and offeror in any significant way," '90
Powell implied that only incidental interference with shareholder choice was
permissible, even if the admitted state objective was to empower management
to "mismanage" the company by defeating a takeover bid for the benefit of
noninvestors. Overall then, Powell's preemption analysis simply did not explore
fully the constitutional relationship between federal law, with its clear but limited
philosophy of protecting investors through the capital markets, and state corporate
184. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46 & n.7.
185. Id. at 1647-48.
186. Id. at 1647 n.9.
187. Id. This remark by Justice Powell seems to equate effective defensive measures with
"mismanagement." If such measures are considered "mismanagement," it is certainly not the kind
of mismanagement that common-law fiduciary principles altogether have prohibited. Moreover, the
remark seems to ignore a possible preemption attack, not against state takeover statutes, but against
state common-law principles that accord directors the discretion to thwart takeover attempts. It
appears that such a constitutional attack on common-law corporate principles has never been made.
For development of such an argument, see Johnson & Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt
State Common Law In Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEc. REG. L.J. 9 (forthcoming Winter 1988).
188. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647 n.9.
189. The ability of a corporation's board of directors to terminate derivative litigation severely
limits its present effectiveness as a constraint on managerial behavior. See, e.g., Edwards, Compelled
Termination and Corporate Governance: The Big Picture, 10 J. CORP. L. 373 (1985); Coffee &
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); AMERICAN LAW INsTrrTUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANcE:
ANAL.YSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Part VII, Remedies (Tent. Draft No. 6, Oct. 10, 1986).
190. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646 n.7.
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law, with both its admitted historic shortcomings in protecting shareholders
through internal mechanisms and its renewed efforts on behalf of noninvestors
to reduce further the role of capital markets (i.e., takeovers) in redressing those
shortcomings.
The dominant theme of Justice Powell's Commerce Clause analysis was
also shareholder protection:
The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the shareholders of
Indiana corporations .... In our view, the possibility of coercion
in some takeover bids offers additional justification for Indiana's
decision to promote the autonomy of independent shareholders ....
It only provides regulatory procedures designed for the better protection
of the corporation's shareholders. 91
In addition to, and somewhat at odds with, this focus on shareholder well-
being, Justice Powell also emphasized the undoubted power of states to:
create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights
that are acquired by purchasing their shares. A state has an interest
in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the
corporations it charters, as well as in insuring that investors in such
corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs .... To the
limited extent that the Act affects interstate commerce, this is justified
by the State's interest in defining the attributes of shares in its
corporations and in protecting shareholders.
192
This analysis indicates that while a state can act through its corporate
statutes to protect its resident shareholders, it also can promote "stable relationships
among parties involved in"' 93 corporations who are, presumably, not investors.
Here Powell may have acknowleded, as he did more explicitly in MITE,
94 the
disruptive effect of takeovers on a state's economy. He was, however, less than
clear in stating exactly what weight state efforts to protect noninvestor interests
should be given in Commerce Clause analysis. 95 Equally important, Powell
emphasized in this passage that a state, and only a state, can define and delimit
191. Id. at 1651-52.
192. Id. at 1650-52 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 1651.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
195. Justice Powell's commerce clause analysis had two prongs: (1) Does the state statute
discriminate against interstate commerce? (2) Does the state statute subject takeover activity to
inconsistent regulation? Arguably, commerce clause analysis is complete after responding to those
questions, thereby rendering obsolete the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970). Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. Rav. 1865, 1866-68
(1987). However, in Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 844 (1st Cir. 1988), the
First Circuit, in reviewing the constitutionality of portions of Massachusetts' takeover law, utilized
the Pike balancing test because the statute under review was not, as in CTS, a "corporate governance"
statute. The First Circuit recognized the permissibility of states legislating to protect certain noninvestor
interests. It held, however, that the challenged section of the Massachusetts law prohibited stock
sales altogether and, consequently, was unduly burdensome under Pike because it severely hurt the
interests of investors. Somehow, the court left out of its balancing test what it had conceded to
be a permissible state consideration-noninvestor interests. No doubt the Supreme Court's failure
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what rights and privileges stock ownership entails. Significantly, he went on to
say that a state may do so in a manner that in actuality damages investors ex
ante: "Accordingly, even if the Act should decrease the number of successful
tender offers for Indiana corporations, this would not offend the Commerce
Clause. "1
96
In citing two grounds other than investor protection on which a state may
utilize its corporate law to influence takeovers, Powell came close to holding
what has been argued in this Part III: the power of states to define attributes
of capital stock can be exercised forthrightly and without resort to the rhetoric
of shareholder protection, a needless and transparently inaccurate rationale.
Justice Powell stopped short of that, however. By making the myth of shareholder
protection the central part of his analysis, he avoided confronting the harsh
reality that many states, acting out of rational self interest, quietly have abandoned,
at least with respect to takeovers, economic orthodoxy and have sought to impair
the free workings of the interstate capital markets to hurt, not help, shareholders.
Frankly recognizing this state objective would create a rather pointed conflict
between the proshareholder concerns of the Williams Act and state takeover
law designed to protect other interests. In addition, it openly would condone
state efforts to safeguard local economic interests at the expense of the supposed
benefits to society at large of an efficient, unrestricted interstate market for
corporate control, benefits that were, however, apparently less clear to the
Supreme Court in 1987 than in 1982.197 In dissenting, Justices White, Blackmun,
and Stevens discussed Indiana's law in precisely those terms, challenging Powell
to confront candidly the flawed nature of an analysis that seeks to reconcile
Indiana's law with investor protection:
to give clearer guidance as to how noninvestor factors bear on the constitutionality of state laws
contributed to the First Circuit's decision and will continue to plague lower courts as they review
takeover statutes. For a persuasive argument that if a statute was "motivated by a general belief
that takeovers leading to corporate removals are unacceptably disruptive of established economic
relations" it would be "perfectly permissible so far as the dormant commerce clause" is concerned,
see Regan, supra, at 1872 (emphasis in ohginal). For a response to Professor Regan's larger argument,
see Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1735, 1735 (1988) (questioning
Regan's territoriality principle: "[lI]t works poorly, if it works at all, as a check on the regulatory
authority of states").
196. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
197. In MITE, the Supreme Court described the effects of the Illinois takeover legislation on
interstate commerce as follows:
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The
reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can
improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mech-
anism provides incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain
high is reduced.
457 U.S. at 643. The basis for this conclusion in MITE is the uncritical adoption of the reasoning
of certain proponents of the "efficient capital market" hypothesis. Citing several studies showing
significant stock price increases resulting from takeovers, see supra note 10 and accompanying text,
these proponents conclude that such increases imply efficiency gains from takeover activity, see
supra note 154 and accompanying text. For a description and critique of that theory as employed
by courts to review state takeover legislation, see Johnson, supra note 5, at 203-07. In CTS, the
Supreme Court did not base its commerce clause analysis on that theory, but in fact appeared to
distance itself from its earlier position: "The constitution does not require the States to subscribe
to any particular economic theory." CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
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The Control Share Acquisitions Chapter will effectively prevent minority
shareholders in some circumstances from selling their stock to a willing
tender offeror. It is the practical impact of the Chapter that leads
to the conclusion that it is preempted by the Williams Act .... A
state law which permits a majority of an Indiana corporation's
stockholders to prevent individual investors, including out-of-state
stockholders, from selling their stock to an out-of-state tender offeror
and thereby frustrate any transfer of corporate control, is the archetype
of the kind of state law that the Commerce Clause forbids. 
198
There are, of course, many unanswered questions about state takeover
legislation after CTS. 99 The point here is that the Supreme Court has reversed
the free-market approach followed by lower courts in reviewing takeover legislation
after MITE,200 and has sanctioned state efforts to reject orthodoxy and to take
away something of great value to shareholders-their long-held right to decide
for themselves, individually, the outcome of a takeover contest. Whether a high
level of takeover activity is as bad for state economic interests as they perceive
is an empirical question on which there is no agreed-upon evidence. What matters
is that state legislators, heavily influenced by incumbent management, fear that
such activity, however good for investors, damages interests having a close
connection to their states. Moving to protect those interests, states at last did,
with the Supreme Court's blessing, what they had not done since the earliest
days of corporate chartering. They utilized their corporate statutes to make a
statement, bold though implicit, about corporate purpose, a statement quite
different from that emerging under post-Revlon common law: when it comes
to takeovers, corporations do not exist chiefly to maximize investor wealth.
IV. Tm CLASH OF JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT
CONDUCT
Having briefly traced how judicial and legislative thinking on takeovers has
evolved to embrace different visions of corporate purpose, the important question
is which will be more influential on management's actual takeover behavior.
Put another way, will control share acquisition statutes, or any other form of
state takeover legislation, really accomplish their objectives in light of the ju-
diciary's rewakened commitment to investor interests? The facts of a recent
case, 01 and certain assumed variations of those facts, provide a way to explore
that question.
A. A Business Combination and Control Share Acquisition Statute in
Action: The Primacy of Investor Interests
On May 6, 1987, Samjens Partners I (Samjens)-in which Asher Edelman
and Dominion Textile were principals-commenced a tender offer for all
outstanding shares of Burlington Industries, Inc. (Burlington) at $67 per share.
198. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1655-56 (White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (Justices
Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice White only on the Coommerce Clause issue) (emphasis added).
199. See infra text accompanying notes 201-40.
200. After MITE, lower courts uncritically accepted as central to their analysis of state takeover
statutes the supposed economic effects described in MITE. See, e.g., Gelco Corp. v. Coniston
Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 840 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 114
(8th Cir. 1987).
201. Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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On May 11 the Burlington board of directors met and determined that the bid
was inadequate. On May 14 Burlington announced a self-tender for twenty-five
percent of its stock at $80 per share, and also stated that the board was
considering other actions to enhance shareholder value, including a possible
recapitalization, merger, or a leveraged buy-out agreement. On May 15 Samjens
increased its bid to $72 per share. On May 20 Burlington and Morgan Stanley
Group, Inc. (Morgan) reached a friendly merger agreement under which Morgan
agreed to tender for all of Burlington's stock at $76 per share. On May 28
Samjens raised its offer to $77 per share and proposed a merger with Burlington
on terms similar to those reached with Morgan. On June 10 Morgan raised its
bid to $78 per share.
During this period the legislature of North Carolina, where Burlington was
headquartered, had been very busy. On April 23 it enacted a Shareholder
Protection Act (Act) which provided that a "business combination" between a
corporation and any entity owning, directly or indirectly, twenty percent or more
of the voting shares of such corporation required the affirmative vote of the
holders of at least ninety-five percent of the voting shares of the corporation.
The Act excepted certain transactions and also exempted from its coverage those
business combinations engaged in by a corporation the board of which, on or
before ninety days after the effective date of the law, opted out of the law. 20 2
On May 1 the North Carolina legislature extended the Act to certain foreign
corporations, thereby bringing Burlington, a Delaware corporation, within its
coverage.203 On May 13 the legislature adopted a Control Share Acquisition
Statute modeled after the Indiana statute upheld by the Supreme Court just
three weeks earlier. 204 Samjens sought to enjoin the merger agreement between
Burlington and Morgan on several grounds, including both a claim that the
Burlington board had failed to conduct the required Revlon auction for the
company, and a claim that the Morgan merger agreement improperly required
Burlington to opt out of the Act for the benefit of Morgan but not for Samjens.
The court first held that the Burlington board had indeed fulfilled its duty to
auction the company because the proposed merger did not end the bidding, but
actually had prompted Samjens to raise its bid to $77 and Morgan to increase
its offer to $78 per share. 201 It then turned to the opt-out issue.
The court observed that, had the board not opted out of the Act, the
proposed merger with Morgan-a business combination under the statute-could
not take place without a shareholder vote and, therefore, might not have occurred
at all. "By opting out, the board was not acting selectively to freeze Edelman
out. Rather, it was enhancing the bidding by securing a $76 bid from Morgan. ' 20 6
While the discussion was very brief, it appears as though the court said that
the Burlington board had fulfilled its common-law fiduciary duty of auctioning
202. Act of April 23, 1987, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 88 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
55-75 to -79.1 (Michie Supp. 1987)).
203. Act of May 1, 1987, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 124 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
55-75 to -79.1, -80 (Michie Supp. 1987)).
204. Act of May 13, 1987, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 182 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
55-90 to -98 (Michie Supp. 1987)).
205. Samjens, 663 F. Supp. at 624-25.
206. Id. at 626.
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the company because it had opted out of a legislatively-prescribed procedure
for business combinations. Reading the statute this way transforms the requirement
of a shareholder vote on a business combination (or on a control share acquisition)
into a statutorily-created defensive measure-similar to a board-created redeemable
poison pill or lock-up option-the sole purpose of which is to strengthen
management's hand in complying with its common-law duty to secure top dollar
for shareholders.
Are the common law and state takeover policies so congruent as that? Did
the North Carolina legislature really enact its several takeover measures to enable
the Burlington board to serve as better "negotiating agents" or "auctioneers"
on behalf of shareholders? The preamble to the North Carolina law whereby
the Act was extended to foreign corporations such as Burlington says a great
deal about North Carolina employees and communities and nothing at all about
shareholders. 20 7 In this respect the law's aim is precisely that of all takeover
statutes-to protect resident noninvestors by reducing takeover activity. Because
it is highly doubtful that the legislature especially was concerned about nonresident
shareholders, and in fact clearly sought to reduce their influence on takeover
contests, then why, notwithstanding the enactment of such takeover legislation,
did the Burlington board-and more generally, why might any board under
siege-behave as Revlon auctioneers? There are several possible answers.
First, whereas the Indiana statute upheld in CTS applied only to Indiana-
chartered (domestic) corporations, 2° North Carolina sought to apply its corporate
laws to a Delaware (foreign) corporation. 20
9 While this indicates that North
Carolina probably has a much greater economic connection to Burlington than
does Delaware, North Carolina may lack the constitutional authority of a
chartering state to delimit the attributes of share ownership. By emphasizing
the power of a state to define stock ownership rights in companies it creates,
Justice Powell's opinion in CTS substantially may restrict the ability of states
to protect other, foreign companies important to their economies-the chartering
connection may also be needed. Yet, because the Indiana law in CTS applied
only to domestic corporations that also had a significant presence in the state 
,210
it is unclear whether, on the one hand, chartering is even a strictly necessary
condition for state action if companies have a substantial presence in the state
2 1
or, on the other, whether chartering is a necessary, but not sufficient condition,
for such action if a substantial presence is lacking. Obviously, if chartering
alone is sufficient, Delaware has a basis-only recently exercised
12-for enacting
207. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
208. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-20-5 (Burns 1988).
209. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
210. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a) (Burns 1988).
211. In TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987), the
Oklahoma Control Share Acquisition Statute was held to be unconstitutional because it sought to
cover not only domestic corporations, but also foreign corporations with substantial connections to
Oklahoma. The court found that the statute posed the "risk of inconsistent regulation by different
states," citing CTS, because the laws of both Oklahoma and Delaware, the state of the target's
incorporation, possibly might regulate the takeover. Id. at 1029; see also Campeau Corp. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735, 738-39 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (enjoining Ohio Foreign Business Corporation
Act, which sought to apply the Ohio Control Share Acquisition statute to non-Ohio companies, as
violative of the commerce clause).
212. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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influential takeover legislation. If chartering is a necessary but not a sufficient
basis for action, then Delaware's law may be unconstitutional as to companies
lacking any other meaningful connection to Delaware."1 3 In that event, a Delaware
corporation seeking takeover protection may reincorporate in that state where it
has the greatest presence-if that state accomodates its locally headquartered com-
panies by enacting favorable takeover legislation. In any case, when Burlington
came under attack Delaware had no takeover statute and, because there was no
time for reincorporation in North Carolina, North Carolina sought to extend the
scope of its statute. Burlington's legal counsel, however, may have had serious
doubts about its constitutionality under CTS, and thus advised the board that
it afforded no sure protection.
Second, being particularly vulnerable during a takeover, directors may be
influenced unduly by investment bankers whose livelihood depends on doing
deals, not simply on resisting unwanted advances. 2'4 Third, legal counsel to a
target company of course will advise the board of its emerging common-law
fiduciary duty to make shareholder interests paramount to that of the company,
particularly in multiple bidder situations where the Revlon duty to auction may
213. In BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988), the United States District
Court for Delaware denied a preliminary injunction against the new Delaware takeover statute,
concluding that it was probably constitutional. Because Delaware's only connection with most
corporations is the chartering connection, the statute cannot be defended on the ground that Delaware
has an interest in protecting noninvestors residing in the states where Delaware companies are
headquartered. Instead, Delaware's law is perhaps the only takeover law that must be defended
purely as a shareholder protection statute. Acknowledging that the statute greatly enhanced man-
agement's power, the court noted that "entrusting management to protect shareholders is the norm
in current corporate law." Id. at 470. In essence, it appears that the court held the law not to be
preempted because it regarded the Williams Act's chief concern to be the objective of investor
protection, not also assuring neutrality between offeror and management as a means to that objective.
The court's reasoning not only conflicts with MITE and its emphasis on the importance of investor
autonomy in takeovers, see supra note 151 and accompanying text, it is much broader, in two
respects, than CTS. First, Powell too emphasized that the Indiana statute "protects the independent
shareholder against both of the contending parties . . . Unlike the MITE statute, the Indiana Act
does not give either management or the offeror an advantage in communicating with the shareholders
about the impending offer .... [T]he Act allows shareholders to evaluate the fairness of the offer
collectively." CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46 (emphasis added). Deleware's statute accords target
management a more central role in resolving takeover conflicts than Indiana's. Second, Powell also
pointed out that Indiana's law would not "alter the balance between management and offeror in
any significant way," thereby apparently condoning only incidental interference with shareholder
choice. Id. at 1646 n.7.
Delaware's law, by empowering management, but not in aid of noninvestor considerations, thus
radically and straightforwardly rejects shareholder autonomy as the only constitutionally accepted
means of attaining the William Act's much heralded goal of investor protection. In doing so,
Delaware seeks to maintain the primacy of its promanagement body of state corporate law over
the workings and advantages to investors of national financial markets. By upholding Delaware's
law, the court in BNS Inc. not only arguably misread MITE and CTS, it rather transparently
favored management over the Williams Act objective of achieving investor protection through investor
choice as expressed in unobstructed capital markets. Several weeks later, the court again upheld
the statute against constitutional attack. RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988). Compare RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Civil Action No. 88-C-378
(E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988) (Wisconsin business combination statute preempted by Williams Act). The
RTE decision was vacated on June 22, 1988, because the case had become moot and no appellate
review would be available.
214. See, e.g., Vise & Coil, Investment Banks, Business at Odds on Takeover Laws, Wash.
Post, Sept. 27, 1987, at HI, col 5.
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be inescapable. Yet that raises the question of why the board must auction the
company at all if a state has passed a constitutional and genuinely effective
takeover statute. Regrettably, even though motivated by a desire to protect
noninvestor interests located in their state, many takeover statutes do not explicitly
inform directors of the relevance of those factors to director decisions and, if
they do, fail to empower directors to protect those interests or to give any other
meaningful guidance on how directors are to respond to a takeover. Finally,
although friendly mergers, restructurings, and leveraged buy-outs often damage
the entity and noninvestor interests as drastically as an auction or break-up
takeover, such resolutions hold more appeal for management than sale to a
hostile bidder. They not only place substantial value in shareholder hands, they
often, at least in the near term, allow members of senior management to retain
their positions.
For one or more of these several reasons, the Burlington board chose to
fulfill its common-law role of auctioneer for investors in spite of a state takeover
statute aimed at achieving quite different goals. 215 To elaborate on the importance
of the last two factors described above, and to explore more generally the effect
of current forms of takeover statutes on target management conduct, it may
be useful to suppose that the facts of the Burlington case were altered slightly.
B. Control Share Acquisition Statute Coupled With a Statute Permitting
Director Consideration of Noninvestor Interests
Assume that the North Carolina legislature had done what Pennsylvania
pioneered 21 6 and what several states have followed: 21 7 added to the director
standard of care section of its corporate statute a provision to the effect that
in formulating takeover strategy a board of directors may consider the interests
of various noninvestors which, frankly, are a state's chief concern anyway.
211
Assume also that the target board believes that both the existing tender offer
and any preemptive measures such as a friendly merger, corporate restructuring,
or leveraged buy-out will significantly, adversely affect certain of these noninvestor
215. Management of the postbuyout Burlington sold or closed 34 of its 84 plants and reduced
the payroll by 18,000 employees. Moreover, while it has reduced debt substantially, debt, $1.6
billion worth, still constitutes 960 of its capital. Burlington's New Weave: Smaller and Tighter,
Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1988, at 35. North Carolina appears not to have achieved its legislative goals
in the Burlington takeover.
216. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988) (previously codified at 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1408(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985)).
217. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)(4) (Anderson 1987); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1987); ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (1985); ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit.
13-A, § 716 (1987-88).
218. The Minnesota statute contains what is probably the fullest description of the various
factors that a target board of directors may consider:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in considering
the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation's em-
ployees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation,
community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term interests
of the corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these interests
may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 Subd. 5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
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groups. Finally, to overcome the chartering and potential conflict of laws
problem, 2 9 assume that Burlington is a North Carolina corporation. How then
does the target board respond to an unsolicited tender offer at a substantial
premium?
While post-Revlon common law increasingly demands that the target board
act in a manner that will extract the highest possible value for shareholders,
here statutory law expressly allows the board to take a much broader view of
corporate purpose and management duty. Yet, it is not at all clear, particularly
in light of the reading that the Burlington court gave to North Carolina's
Shareholder Protection Act as essentially a bargaining device, 220 that courts will
construe takeover statutes as overriding the common-law duty to auction the
company or otherwise to maximize shareholder well-being. Furthermore, if a
target board refrains from pursuing friendly merger partners, under a control
share acquisition statute a bidder that conditionally offers to buy twenty percent
or more of the target company stock 221 can trigger a shareholder plebiscite to
determine whether to enfranchise those shares. 222 It is likely that target
shareholders-both those who have held their stock for a long time and
arbitrageurs-will grant voting rights to a bidder making a sufficiently attractive
offer if their board is not pursuing other value-enhancing options out of a belief
that they too will jeopardize the entity and its constituent relationships. 223 What
then, if anything, can such a board do actively to influence either the larger
control contest or the outcome of the shareholder vote itself during the fifty-
day period prior to the shareholder meeting? After all, delay was a key strategic
element in the design of control share acquisition statutes,22 but delay so
management can do what?
Implementing a poison pill rights plan to thwart the bidder is highly vulnerable
at this stage because Revlon and its progeny sanctioned that device only because
it "spurred the bidding to new heights" and thus ultimately served investor
219. Massachusetts, like many other states, applied its control share statute to foreign cor-
porations to help a locally-headquartered company-in this case Gillette-that is incorporated in
Delaware. Doing so, however, raises the possibility of such a statute conflicting with the laws of
the chartering state, thereby creating inconsistent regulation and a Commerce Clause problem. See
supra note 211 and accompanying text. Massachusetts sought to avoid a constitutional conflict by
providing that its law will be inapplicable to foreign companies when the laws of the chartering
state expressly limit, restrict, or otherwise affect the voting rights of any person proposing to acquire
control shares in a manner expressly inconsistent with Massachusetts law. Act of July 21, 1987,
1987 Mass. Acts ch. 272, § 2 (codified at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. IIOE (West Supp. 1988)).
The efficacy of such a provision in avoiding, much less resolving, a conflicts of law issue is suspect
because the laws of the chartering state may well conflict with Massachusetts law even though they
are not "expressly inconsistent." Although a test of this provision was avoided when no strong
bid for Gillette materialized, the issue is likely to be presented in the not too distant future.
220. See supra text accompanying note 203.
221. In CTS, Justice Powell expressly approved the use of conditional offers to purchase stock
under control share statutes. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1647 (1987).
222. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Burns 1988).
223. Peter Drucker has argued that because many shareholders are themselves institutional
trustees, such as managers of pension funds, they may have "little choice as to whether they want
to sell their shares if someone bids substantially above what the same shares fetch at the market
price. They have to accept. If they were to say 'no,' they would lay themselves open to an enormous
and uninsurable liability." Drucker, supra note 66, at 11.
224. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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interests. 225 Moreover, any defensive measures aimed at protecting either the
corporate entity or noninvestors that also serve successfully to interfere with
shareholder resolution of the hostile bid's outcome, because states have adopted
the rhetoric of investor protection and ostensibly have placed the bid's outcome
in their hands, may have the ironic effect of violating legislative intent. While
a statute allowing directors to consider noninvestor interests may enable a board
to refrain from actively auctioning the company during the preplebiscite period,
it is hard to believe that a court will allow it to take defensive measures that
clearly impair the stated aim of control share legislation-fair shareholder
consideration of the hostile offer. In upholding Indiana's control share statute,
the Supreme Court made it very clear that it did so because it "protects the
independent shareholder against both of the contending parties . . . . Unlike the
MITE statute, the Indiana Act does not give either management or the offeror
an advantage in communicating with the shareholders about the impending
offer. . . [T]he Act allows shareholders to evaluate the fairness of the offer
collectively.' '226
The problem is that the same statute allowing directors to consider the
interests of noninvestors and the entity also provides that shareholders will make
the ultimate decision on the company's fate. In adopting a rhetoric and scheme
of pure shareholder democracy to meet constitutional objections, while retaining
an element of representative democracy by which a board of directors may take
account of multiple interests, a modified control share statute seeks at once to
go in opposite directions. Such a statute lacks any mechanism by which a board
of directors, believing that both a takeover and defensive measures will harm
the entity and its constituent interests, can act decisively to achieve what it truly
regards as the contest's proper outcome. Indeed, what role other than either
remaining entirely passive or providing additional, noncoercive investment options
for investors could a board have under such a statute? A board in this situation
simply is powerless to act on behalf of the entity itself or vulnerable noninvestor
groups. Thus, even this seemingly potent addition to a control share statute will
fail to accomplish its objectives. It will fail because as a corporate law presumably
aimed at enhancing investor welfare it will be construed to do just what it
says-enfranchise shareholders-not what it really seeks-deploy corporate law
to preserve management discretion to protect other, less orthodox interests.
C. Statute Permitting Director Consideration of Noninvestor Interests
Coupled With Statute Requiring Director Approval of Business Combinations
or Control Share Acquisitions
Suppose that North Carolina had been bolder, and truly had empowered
the target board to take a broader view of its responsibilities. For example,
assume a somewhat different business combination statute had been enacted,
such as the one first approved in New York, 227 and recently adopted, with some
225. See supra notes 85 & 89 and accompanying text.
226. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645-46 (1987) (emphasis added).
227. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 912 (Consol. Supp. 1987). In Salant Acquisition Corp. v.
Manhattan Indus., 682 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), New York's takeover statute was challenged
as unconstitutional. The court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground
that plaintiff, for several reasons, had failed to make a showing of irreparable harm. Thus, while
briefly discussing the effects of the law on takeovers, the court did not pass on its constitutionality.
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modifications, by several other states, including Delaware. 228 That statute prohibits
any business combination between the target company and a twenty percent
shareholder for five years after acquisition of the twenty percent block unless,
prior to the acquisition, the target board had approved either the stock acquisition
itself or the proposed business combination. 229 After five years, a business
combination requires approval of a disinterested majority of shareholders or
payment of a statutorily-defined fair price. 2 0 Or, suppose a state went even
farther and provided that no significant share acquisition could take place without
target board approval. In either case, the proposed business combination or
control share acquisition would require not only shareholder consent but also
express approval of the board of directors. In short, a state comes clean and
announces that it has no genuine interest in protecting shareholders or placing
the outcome of a takeover contest solely in their hands. Or, perhaps less bluntly,
asserts that a corporation's board of directors should have, as with mergers and
asset sales, an important voice in the proposed transaction. Assume too that
the offeror intends to finance the purchase by selling off certain target company
assets, a transaction falling within the definition of "business combination. '23'
Thus, there is a substantial offer, a board of directors genuinely concerned
about the takeover's impact on the entity or various noninvestor interests, and
a statute that both enables board of director consideration of noninvestor interests
and that requires board approval to accomplish a significant facet of the proposed
takeover.
In this scenario, post-Revlon common law still will require, or at least
strongly influence, directors to auction the company or take other shareholder
wealth-maximizing measures. Statutory law, however, authorizes and apparently
empowers the board to reject that course of action. Could a target board of
directors utilize what seems to be a truly potent statute to avoid its common-
law duty and, thus, thwart an unwanted but lucrative takeover? Realistically,
would directors ever do so? There are several reasons why, in spite of a well
fortified statutory arsenal, they might not.
First, for all their rhetoric about occupying a position of stewardship for
various stakeholders, directors themselves may not truly believe that their function
is anything other than what orthodoxy prescribes-to secure top dollar for
shareholders-at least if it can be done in a manner that also accommodates
their own desires. Second, upon advice of legal counsel a board simply might
believe that acting contrary to investor interests is too risky. Shareholders may
claim-whether persuasively is unclear-that in acting to protect noninvestor
interests directors breach their common-law fiduciary duty, notwithstanding the
existence of statutory authorization.232 Other constituencies, including the state,
cannot make any claim against directors for failure to protect noninvestor interests
228. See sources cited supra note 3.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.011, subd. 46 (Supp. 1987).
232. That this could happen is seen in CTS itself. Even though Indiana provides that directors
may consider noninvestor interests, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns 1988), that played no
part in Judge Posner's proshareholder analysis of a target boards's takeover duty. Dynamics Corp.
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256-59 (7th Cir. 1986).
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because the new standard of care statutes provide only that directors may consider
their interests, not that they must. 233 The permissive nature of the statutes, along
with the absence of a meaningful enforcement mechanism, leaves such groups
with no remedy for a breach of the statute.
234 Even if consideration of such
factors was mandatory, management is given no guidance as to how various
interests are to be weighed and reconciled. As a result, either directors are
imbued with uncontrollably broad authority or, to ensure management's compliance
with the statute, 235 courts would be called on to scrutinize carefully management
conduct, a task they traditionally have resisted.
Third, if directors availed themselves of their statutory power and successfully
resisted a takeover on behalf of noninvestor constituencies, shareholders-especially
institutional investors and arbitrageurs-later may assert their disenchantment
with a board's takeover conduct by seeking to oust (or voting with an insurgent
seeking to oust) incumbent directors through the proxy machinery.
236 Ultimately,
however unimportant and uncontroversial to the governance of most corporations
at most times, shareholders alone elect directors. With institutional investors
showing renewed vigor and interest in shareholder matters ,237 they might seek
either to remove those directors who, having once blocked their much-valued
opportunity to tender, may do so again, or, in return for not siding with a
dissident faction, extract various concessions from the board that will bolster
shareholder say on corporate matters. This is especially likely to happen given
that stock ownership tends to concentrate in the hands of investors seeking
short-term gains during periods of speculation about a takeover.
2 3 s Knowing this,
directors may be inclined to avoid conduct that jeopardizes their positions,
233. An exception to this is the Arizona statute which states that directors "shall consider
the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders including
the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the cor-
poration." ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202A (1987) (emphasis added).
234. Axworthy, supra note 14, at 409-13.
235. Professor Axworthy makes this point about § 46 of the United Kingdom Companies Act
of 1980 which states that directors "shall include [in their deliberations] the interests of the company's
employees in general as well as the interests of its members." Id. at 408 (quoting U.K. Companies
Act 1980, ch. 22, § 46).
236. Under Minnesota's corporate statute, for example, a shareholder owning 10% or more
of the voting power of all shares entitled to vote may demand a special meeting of shareholders
to elect directors. MINN STAT. § 302A.433(e) (1985). Because the holders of a majority of the voting
power of the shares present and entitled to vote are a quorum, theoretically a potential acquiror
could purchase very little stock, then solicit proxies in sufficient number to demand a special meeting
and, finally, by garnering the voting support of as little as 25.0107o of the outstanding shares, elect
a new board of directors that would be more hospitable to the attempted acquisition. Id. §§
302A.443, .437.
237. Recently, for example, the Council of Institutional Investors, a coalition of pension funds,
adopted a shareholder "bill of rights" for the purpose of reasserting the role of investors in corporate
decision-making and making corporate management more accountable to shareholders, especially in
takeovers. Vise, "Bill of Rights" Seeks to Boost Power of Shareholders, Wash. Post, Apr. 13,
1986, at Fl, col. 1. Also, T. Boone Pickens, Jr., a frequent bidder for corporations, has established
a nonprofit organization-United Shareholders of America-to advocate shareholder interests. Victor,
Pickens' Plan Gets Mixed Reviews From Bar, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 9, col. 1.
238. For example, when Gillette was a takeover candidate more than 50% of its outstanding
stock reportedly was held by institutions, while at least an additional 15076 was concentrated in the
hands of arbitragers or other short-term speculators. Wessel, Gillette's Status as a Takeover Play
Is Placed In Doubt as Stock Falls With Rest of Market, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 61, col 3.
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especially because various preemptive measures, while adversely affecting the
very noninvestor interests the state seeks to protect, can at once defeat the bid,
mollify the shareholders, and preserve management jobs.
Finally, if a truly potent takeover statute is not simply employed as a
bargaining device for management to extract more shareholder value from a
bidder, but might actually be used to defeat a takeover attempt, it hardly lends
itself to the investor protection rhetoric Justice Powell employed in upholding
Indiana's law. 239 While Powell's CTS opinion stated that a reduction in the
number of successful tender offers as a result of Indiana's law would not offend
the Commerce Clause,2" ° that law, as argued, probably wouldn't have that effect
anyway. Are the other less prominent rationales for Powell's Commerce Clause
analysis-state power to define the attributes of stock ownership and a state's
interest in promoting stable corporate relationships-sufficient grounds for
upholding a law that clearly and substantially does reduce takeover activity, an
effect that, by the very nature of capital markets, is interstate in character?
In essence, a truly powerful takeover statute would require the Court to
determine whether capital providers, who realize substantial gains from corporate
activity via transactions on interstate financial markets, constitutionally are preferred
to those more local noninvestor interests that states believe sometimes are damaged
by sudden large-scale exchanges of stock on those very markets. When confronted
with statutes putting the issue so pointedly, the Court must abandon the veneer
of shareholder protection as a basis for upholding takeover statutes. Instead,
if it sustains such legislation, its decisions must rest squarely on the right of
states-as creators of corporate entities choosing to protect a broad array of
interests dependent on those entities-to define the property rights of corporate
stock in such a way that holders thereof constitutionally are not entitled to
either receive, or act decisively on, tender offers for their stock.
Even if a more potent statute could escape Commerce Clause attack, it
poses a much starker preemption issue than did Indiana's statute. Any attempt
to veil such legislation in shareholder protection rhetoric would be completely
transparent. 24' Yet, straightforward state efforts to utilize corporate law to protect
noninvestor interests would face a substantial risk of running afoul of the Williams
Act's proinvestor orthodoxy and its myopic view of takeovers as affecting but
three parties-bidder, target management, and target shareholders. Here too, if
presented with such a statute, the Supreme Court must determine whether the
federal policy of protecting investors through the external capital markets is
inconsistent constitutionally with state policy aimed at protecting other interests
through the internal corporate mechanism of the board of directors.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 181-88.
240. See supra text accompanying note 193.
241. SEC Commisissioner Joseph A. Grundfest recently testified in opposition to a proposed
Maryland takeover statute that would combine the control share acquisition approach of Indiana
with the business combination approach of New York and the already-existing fair price approach
of Maryland. Grundfest testified that the proposed law was not only incredibly complex, but that
it also "indiscriminately burdens all bids disapproved by management, without regard to their
structure or substance, [and thereby] underscores the lack of an investor protection rationale for
this legislation .... [T]here is little doubt that the bill is, at bottom, pro-manager and anti-
shareholder." Grundfest Speaks Against Proposed Maryland Antitakeover Statute, Exchange Act
Release No. 1278, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 12-13, (Mar. 23, 1988).
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All of these reasons coalesce to highlight the fatal flaw in the design of
current takeover legislation. As states assiduously sought to overcome the
constitutional objections of MITE they turned to that most secure area for state
action-corporate law. While this strategy appeared to be vindicated in CTS,
Indiana's statute, drafted in the shadow of MITE, was over-cautious and, as
argued, will be ineffective. Thus, stronger statutes following the same basic
strategy, but seeking to equip target management to play a more decisive role
in takeovers, will present a truer test. Nonetheless, while shrewd and necessitated
by MITE, a strategy of relying on corporate statutes to combat takeovers is
futile ultimately because, at bottom, corporate law in our society long has
concerned itself with a rather narrow province-the investor-manager relationship.
Employees, communities, suppliers, and the public interest are interlopers in this
scheme. Even though states genuinely may be concerned about the well-being
of these interests, and are prepared to curtail the individual shareholder's right
to sell his or her stock in favor of collective shareholder or even director action
on tender offers, they are not about to subvert the very premises of corporate
law by wholly eliminating shareholder influence on corporate matters or by
providing noninvestor groups with a direct voice in takeover decisions. Instead,
having stilled somewhat the new-found influence takeovers provide to investors,
states naturally have turned to a corporation's board of directors as the only
available body under the existing regime of corporate governance that can act
for the good of multiple interests. There is, however, little more to this strategy
than the vague hope that management will maintain, somehow, those business
policies that serve the economic interests of the state and its residents. Yet, as
seen, the continuing pressure of common-law fiduciary principles, management's
own predilections, the ultimate threat of ouster by shareholders, the great
uncertainty as to the reach of CTS, and, pervading all of these, the deeply
imbedded and abiding influence of economic orthodoxy, are such that management
cannot confidently be depended on to do what states desire.
Thus, as our private enterprise society undergoes substantial and continuing
transformation, a state finds that its economic fortunes, as well as its takeover
laws, remain subject to the decisions of corporate management.
242 In turn, even
in states adopting fairly forceful takeover legislation, these decisions strongly
and inescapably are influenced, as orthodoxy holds they ought to be, by the
desires of the ultimate authority in corporate law and capitalism-the providers
of capital. In the end, states fall victim to their own rhetorical pretext that
takeover laws are aimed at protecting shareholders, and to their own carefully
crafted strategy of utilizing corporate statutes to accomplish their goals. As a
result, they are unable to supplant a management and shareholder-centered
conception of the corporation with one taking a more spacious view of the
claim that various noninvestor groups have on corporate activities, either by
directly empowering such groups or by providing for their well-being through
242. The words of Justice Jackson are as true today as when first spoken: "Whether for
good or ill, the stubborn fact is that in our present system the corporation carries on the bulk of
production and transportation, is the chief employer of both labor and capital, pays a large part
of our taxes, and is an economic institution of such magnitude and importance that there is no
present substitute for it except the State itself." State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 192
(1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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some means other than management discretion. 243 Doubtless, fear of preemption
by the Williams Act's unrealistic vision of the corporate world plays a role.
More basically, however, such a notion is simply so foreign to current conceptions
of corporate law that, when all is said and done, present takeover statutes,
while hardly shareholder protection acts, will not radically alter the fundamental
postulate of orthodoxy that corporations exist for the primary benefit of
shareholders, and that management's foremost duty at all times-even in
takeovers-is to provide for their well-being. Whether this failure means that
proposed takeover solutions will once again come from outside the corporation,
perhaps at the federal level, 2" or whether it will prompt further efforts to
redefine and genuinely enrich current notions of corporate governance by taking
better account of noninvestor claimants, is unknown.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Widespread agreement on the overall economic utility of frequent takeover
activity would go a long way toward reducing the controversy such activity has
generated. Clear evidence that takeover transactions serve not only the wealth
and governance interests of investors, but also advance the desire of society at
large to remain prosperous and competitive in a rapidly changing world economy,
would make the economic case for takeovers. In that event, Congress could
overcome state-imposed obstacles to such transactions by expressly preempting
the area in the manner requested by SEC Chairman David Ruder and others. 245
While many people believe we are at that point today, the economic case
for takeovers-largely dependent on stock price event studies2 "0-has not been
made convincingly. There is simply too much evidence that raises serious doubts
about the general utility of widespread takeover activity.2 47 As such, an important
underpinning for takeover transactions-demonstrated overall economic benefit-
falls away, leaving investor well-being as the strongest argument for continued
high levels of such activity. Thus, there is a potential rift between the interests
of capital providers and those of others, both local and larger societal interests.
Economic and legal orthodoxy provides for no such rift, assuming instead a
substantial congruence of investor and other important interests. It is little wonder
243. While alternative conceptions of corporate activity and corporate governance have never
been implemented in the United States, they continue to be advanced. See, e.g., M. AOKI, supra
note 16, at 3; Solomon & Collins, supra note 14, at 331; Axworthy, supra note 14, at 392.
244. The Senate Banking Committee recently approved a takeover bill that would make several
changes to federal law. S. REp. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Report to accompany the
Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987 (S.1323)). For example, the bill would increase
from 20 to 35 business days the period for shareholders to respond to a tender offer; require a
purchaser's Schedule 13D notice of acquisition of more than 5% of a corporation's stock to be
filed within five days rather than the present ten days; prohibit a buyer who has purchased at least
250o of a company's stock from purchasing additional shares except through a tender offer; prohibit
the payment by a target company of premium prices-' greenmail" -for more than 3% of a bidder's
stock. The bill would not preempt state takeover law. The House Energy and Commerce Committee
is also considering, but has not yet acted on, a takeover bill. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
245. Sontag, SEC Pre-emption Idea Gets Plaudits, Nat'l. L.J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
246. See supra notes 10 & 154 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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then that the common law, bounded as it is by such orthodoxy, eventually
would insist that management respond to takeovers in a manner that serves
shareholders, the traditional focal point of corporate endeavor.
Federal law, the Williams Act, similarly is taken by the simple elegance of
orthodoxy-serve the interests of investors and all will be well for the public
good. Only states, perhaps for all the wrong reasons-managements' irresistable
political influence and an almost reflexive desire to protect local economic
interests-have acted to challenge conventional thinking. Oddly, the strategy of
choosing corporate law to do so led them into the very heart of orthodoxy,
and, as argued, is the reason for their probable failure.
Yet the implications of the states' thinking on takeovers for legal and
economic orthodoxy merit reflection, whatever their ultimate fate. Suppose the
common law and the Williams Act, in their professed devotion to the interests
of capital providers, wrongly are conceived? Could it possibly be that, with
respect to takeovers, unfailing allegiance to investor interests, overall, is adverse
to societal interests, not simply local interests but those more national in scope
as well? The implications of such an outcome potentially are disturbing. Man-
agement is perceived to have held the upper hand in its relationship with investors
for so long that takeovers at last provide shareholders with an effective coun-
terpoise. Yet, if the consequences of that are unsettling, many would simply
swing the corporate pendulum back toward management prerogative, and free
them of the excessive influence takeovers provide to investors. This oft-heard
remedy is itself troubling, however, and reveals the unfortunate debility of
present-day corporate law-one either favors management or shareholders, both
of which are problematic; there are no other options, no wholly-new paradigms
for recasting corporate law issues into a framework more resonant with broader
concerns.
Thus, takeovers present an opportunity to revisit basic issues: does the
fundamental postulate of economic orthodoxy operate for the general good when
extended to its logical end in takeovers? If not, what then is the purpose of
corporate activity when companies are confronted with hostile bids? As to
corporate governance, are the alternatives either to favor the awesome power
takeovers provide shareholders or to rearm management in its defense? The
takeover phenomenon may bring us to an impasse on these issues, to a point
where traditional positions, even language, on corporate purpose and corporate
governance must be reexamined in an effort to reconcile conflicting goals. In
an increasingly complex, diverse and competitive world, where there is growing
concern about the lack of shared ideals and aspirations, persuasively restating
the reasons for the orthodox beliefs of an earlier, simpler day is sure to be a
daunting task. Yet, no competing vision capable of commanding widespread
support is in sight. We stand at a point where the flaws of one intellectual
framework are becoming clearer while no alternative ordering is emerging. As
discussion about the elemental issues, raised by takeovers continues to develop,
the question for corporate law is this: Will it flourish by being in the very midst
of today's larger social currents, or, by holding fast to its limited concerns,
will it stand stubbornly to the side?
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